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COMMENT
Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an
Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic
Writing and Signature Legislation
I. Introduction
Law is inextricably entwined with formalism. Formalities serve an integral role
in law by focusing on the rights and responsibilities of parties in reference to
compliance with prescribed rules and standards, thereby ensuring legal deter-
minations are not arrived at arbitrarily.' Formalism is therefore a guard against the
inadvertent enforcement of obligations. Examples of such formalistic prescriptions
are laws requiring writings and signatures. By not only providing a reliable source
of evidence of a transaction,2 but also requiring compliance with statutory
formalities in assuming obligations, writings and signatures better assure parties of
the validity and enforceability of their agreement. Nevertheless, ink on paper is not
the only method of advancing these purposes.
History teaches that parties originally executed contracts in ritualistic ceremonies.
At one time in Scotland, contracts were formed in a ceremony whereby the parties
wetted their thumbs and pressed them together, while in other parts of the country,
both parties to a contract would spit on the ground? In early Bavaria, one had to
box the ears of a young boy to effect a conveyance of real property Without this
formality, the conveyance was void.' The earliest forms of Anglo-Saxon formal
contracts were created by the delivery of a trivial chattel and the furnishing of
substantial security in the form of sureties.6 All of these rituals were formalistic,
yet a writing or signature evidenced none of these agreements as a matter of
necessity.
1. See ROBERTO MANGABERIA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 204 (1976).
2. Ink on paper signatures, of course, are not necessarily reliable sources of evidence. Initially,
because signatures can be any mark made with the intent to sign, there is no prohibition against a signer
frequently changing the form of his or her signature. In addition, forensic science cannot guarantee a
signature is not a forgery nor can it prove that a signature was made by a person with authority to sign.
Moreover, in a multiple page document signed at the end, no guarantee exists that the preceding pages
were not substituted. See Benjamin Wright, Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic
Signatures, 15 J. MARSHALL COMPUTER & INFO. L. 189, 190 (1997).
3. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 43 (1974).
4. See James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L RET. 1009, 1033 (1992).
5. See id.
6. See Harold D. Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 608,
609 (1910).
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Certainly, no one would argue that such rituals should be used today, yet at one
time they were peifectly acceptable methods of forming binding agreements. Of
course, more effective and efficient methods for creating legal obligations replaced
these seemingly archaic practices. Undoubtedly, the widespread use of paper,
coupled with the growing literacy of the working class, were significant factors in
the elimination of many traditional practices.
At present, technological advancements have brought new methods that are now
poised to replace paper and ink. These new technologies provide efficient
alternatives to traditional writings and signatures, while preserving the purposes
behind writing and signature requirements. Oklahoma, along with a majority of
other states, has partially embraced this transformation by enacting the Electronic
Writings and Signatures Act of 1998,' hereinafter the Oklahoma Act.
The Oklahoma Act was passed to give legal effect to new electronic methods of
writings and signatures. The Oklahoma Act and many others like it, however,
exclude some typ.s of transactions where the formalism, evidence, or other
considerations mandate a traditional form of a signed writing. For example, the
Oklahoma Act excludes all laws regarding mortgages. As a result, mortgages must
still be in paper and signed by pen despite the existence of technologies which allow
the creation of electronic mortgages."
At first glance, it is perhaps surprising that of the thousands of statutes calling for
a writing or signature, only a few have been specifically excepted from the
Oklahoma Act. A conclusion should not hastily be drawn, however, that this lack
of exclusions mean3 that electronic signatures and writings virtually always satisfy
the purposes behind laws calling for writings and signatures. The dearth of
exclusions arises fiom the fact that absent exhaustive research, the legislature is
incapable of assessing each law and determining whether it should be covered by
the Oklahoma Act. Concomitantly, without conducting a thorough examination of
each rule calling for a signature or a writing and the purposes behind those rules,
the elucidated exclusions may be too broad. To remedy this problem, the Oklahoma
Act also includes a catch-all "repugnancy" provision. This clause purports to
exclude all laws that express a manifest intent that is inconsistent with the use of
an electronic format. By its express terms, the Oklahoma Act is also subordinate
to consumer protection laws and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). '
While the Oklahoma Act is a step in the right direction in embracing the growth
of electronic commerce, this comment argues that its exclusions are too broad, and
further, no direction exists in determining when an inconsistency arises between an
existing rule of law expressed in consumer protection laws, the UCC, or otherwise,
and an electronic medium. This comment concludes that repugnancy is a fluid
concept that should vary based on the technology used, and that blanket exclusions
7. 15 OKLA. STAT. §§ 960-968 (Supp. 1998).
8. See generally James A. Newell & Michael R. Gordon, Electronic Commerce and Negotiable
Instruments (Electronic Promissory Notes), 31 IDAHO L. REV. 819, 830-31 (1995).
9. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 963(B)(5) (Supp. 1998).




will only arrest the growth of electronic commerce. Accordingly, this comment
applauds the Oklahoma Act's use of a repugnancy clause and attempts to
demonstrate how this clause should be applied - it illustrates the methodology
which should be used in assessing whether an electronic method fails to satisfy the
purposes behind traditional writing and signature requirements. This comment,
however, does not address political considerations that may play a significant role
in defining excluded areas. For example, this comment argues that wills should not
be excluded based on a technological incompatibility with will formalities.
Nevertheless, lawmakers may decide that political factors preclude their inclusion.
Part I of this comment examines many of the current forms of electronic records
and signatures. Part III discusses the status of electronic writing and signature
legislation. Part IV attempts to provide guidance in determining the meaning of
repugnancy in an electronic age by examining the purposes behind writing and
signature requirements and applying those purposes to specific statutes. Part V
assesses the need for a repugnancy clause and examines both the benefits and
burdens associated with such an approach.
II. What Are Electronic Records and Signatures?
A. Electronic Records
People use electronic records every day of their lives. Typed input stored on
home computers, electronic mail messages sent to friends, voice messages on
answering machines, and software contained on CD-ROMs all constitute electronic
records.
Legally, the term "record" refers to any information that is inscribed or stored on
a tangible medium and retrievable in an electronic form." An electronic record
means "a record created, stored, generated, received or communicated by electronic
means."'" The Reporter's Comment to section 102 of the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (ETA) states that this definition is not meant to be limited to
records used for communicating, but also includes information stored in an
electronic format. 3
This intentionally broad definition permits electronic records to be created by a
home computer, fax machine, voice mail, or any other electronic device. Likewise,
11. See id. § 962(7); see also U.T.A. § 102(13) (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999).
12. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 962(3) (Supp. 1998); see aLo U.E.T.A. § 102(7) (Final Draft July 23-30,
1999).
13. See U.E.T.A. § 102 cmt. 6 (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999). The ETA is one of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' projects dealing with electronic commerce. The
project was undertaken "to draft an act consistent with but not duplicative of the Uniform Commercial
Code, relating to the use of electronic communications and records in contractual transactions." U.E.T.A.
Prefatory Note (Draft July 24-31, 1998). Copies of ETA drafts and committee memoranda can be found
at <http.//www.law.upenn.edu/bllulclule.htm>. The UCC includes its own adjustments to electronic
communications. Modifications exist in article 2, article 2A, article 2B, article 4A, article 5, article 8, and
proposed article 9 of the UCC. Another source for information on the ETA is the ETA Forum, which is
located at <http:lwww.webcom.cornlegaled/ETAForumlindex.html>.
19991
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data can be stored on a magnetic tape, floppy disk, CD-ROM, or hard drive, to
name a few.
B. Electronic Signatures
An electronic signature is simply any symbol, mark or method, accomplished by
electronic means, executed by a party with the present intent to be bound by a
record or to authenticate a record.14 The Oklahoma Act broadly defines a signature
as:
[Any symbol, sound, process or encryption of a record in whole or in
part executed or adopted by a person or the person's electronic agent
with the intent to identify the person and to either
a. adopt or accept a term or record, or
b. establish the informational integrity of a record or term that con-
tains the signature or to which a record containing the signature
refers.
15
The Oklahoma Act further defines an electronic signature as "any signature in
electronic form attached to or logically associated with an electronic record executed





These definitions are appropriately technologically neutral - they do not specify
a particular type of technology that must be used."1 According to these definitions,
an electronic signature can be a facsimile signature, a name at the bottom of an e-
mail message, an e-mail origination header, a digital signature, a biometric method,
a personal identification number (PIN), a smart card, or any number of other
methods.
An important difference among many electronic methods, however, is the level
of security provided. Undoubtedly, the propriety of using an electronic method
depends on the degree of the security needed. Fortunately, numerous technologies,
including digital signatures and biometrics, exist which provide varying degrees of
message integrity rnd security. Secured methods are generally complex and are not
required by the Oklahoma Act,'" nevertheless, a cursory understanding of these
14. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Analyzing State Digital Signature Legislation (visited Aug. 4, 1998)
<http.//www.mbc.comds-rev.html> (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
15. 15 OKLA. STjT. § 962(10) (Supp. 1998); see also U.E.T.A. § 102 (Draft July 24-31, 1998)
(defining a signature m; "an identifying symbol, sound, process or encryption of a record in whole or in
part, executed or adopted by a person").
16. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 962(4) (Supp. 1998); see also U.B.T.A. § 102(8) (Final Draft July 23-30,
1999) (defining "electLonic signature" in a similar manner).
17. Electronic writing and signature legislation should not mandate a particular technological
method. Initially, such an approach ignores the fact that many different methods exist that can achieve
a writing or signatuir requirement's purpose. Second, such an approach entrenches a particular
technology and discourages market development. See C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners:
Digital Signature Laws and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace (visited July 8, 1998) <http'/
www.acusd.edu/%7Ebiddle/LMW,html> (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review); see also Broderick,
infra note 35; White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 1, 1997).




methods is important for several reasons. First, Oklahoma law permits these
methods. Second, fourteen states allow only electronic signatures that comply with
specified security procedures, namely digital signatures.'9 Additionally, business
practices that demand a high level of security are already using, and will
increasingly use secure methods. The principle reason for examining these methods,
however, is that they offer a high degree of reliability. Accordingly, they add an
element to signature requirements that mere authorization of electronic signatures
does not address.
1. Digital Signatures
The phrase "digital signature" is a term of art. It refers to a process whereby a
mathematical formula secures and authenticates a message.? A digital signature
is actually the combination of two processes. The first process is a "public key
encryption," which is a particular method of using algorithms to scramble a
communication' The second process is a hash function. This process verifies the
integrity of a message.'
Cryptography and secret key encoding actually are ancient methods for securing
communications. Secret key encoding allows two parties to encode and decode
messages while keeping the content secret from others.' With a public key system,
users have software that generates two related keys - a public key and a private
key.u The fundamental characteristic of the key pairs is that only the public key
to study electronic commerce, including digital signatures. This section states that "[t]he pilot program
will provide verifiable data on how electronic commerce and digital signatures can improve the internal
services and operations of state government and how it can enable and encourage the use of electronic
commerce, including digital signatures, in transactions with business and commerce." Id. Additionally,
the program will study and propose appropriate standards for digital signatures.
19. See infra note 59.
20. See Daniel Greenwood, Electronic Signatures and Records: Legal, Policy and Technical




23. The Internet, however, is poorly suited to secret key encoding. Because it is an open network
where messages pass from system to system, the Internet creates a serious risk that a third party could
intercept a secret key. A secret key is simply the method used for decoding, similar to a decoder ring
found in a Cracker Jack box. The security risk stems from the fact that to send a message over the
Internet, one must also transmit the code or the "decoder ring." This code is susceptible to interception,
thereby nullifying the value of an encrypted message. See Greenwood, supra note 20.
Public key cryptography is a potential solution to this problem. Public key cryptography eliminates
the need for users to share a secret key, which makes it ideal for use over the Internet. See Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, Information Technology Division, The Basics of Public Key Cryptography and
Digital Signatures (visited Aug. 7, 1998) <http.//www.state.ma.usitd/legal/crypto-3.html> (on file with
the Oklahoma Law Review).
24. Users keep their private keys secure while making their public keys freely available by posting
them on the Internet. Suppose Jack, the holder of a private key, wants to send Mary an encrypted
message. Jack can encrypt the message with his private key and send the message to Mary. Mary can
then retrieve Jack's public key from the Internet and decrypt the message. Furthermore, if Mary wants
to reply to Jack, she can encrypt the message using Jack's public key. Because only Jack's private key
1999]
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can decrypt a mes;age encoded with the private key, and likewise, only the private
key can decode a message encoded with the public key,'
A hash function is a process used to verify the integrity of a message. This
procedure creates a number that represents a larger amount of data, here, the
message.' This number is called the message digest. Any changes to the message,
even minor changes, will produce a different message digest.' A sender can
transmit an enclyted communication along with a message digest. The recipient
will then decode the message, and using the same software program, run a hash
function on the message. If the message digests are the same, the recipient knows
that no one tampered with or changed the message during transmission.'
A key issue, however, becomes the ability to associate a party with a particular
key. Without further security measures, recipients of messages are incapable of
verifying that senders are indeed who they claim. Digital certificates issued by third
parties are a propSed solution. Certificates are digitally signed documents that
attest to the connection of a public encryption key to an individual. The third
parties are known as certification authorities (CAs)."
The CA issues a certificate that identifies the person associated with a given
public key (the subscriber). The CA is responsible for taking certain steps to verify
the identity of te subscriber." After assuring itself of the identity of the
subscriber, the CA. issues the subscriber a certificate attesting to the connection
between the subscriber and a public key.' When the subscriber wishes to send a
message, he or she would send the message along with a message digest and a
certificate that links himself or herself to the public key. The recipient can then go
to an online database to check the validity of the certificate." Although the
can decrypt the messag.,-, Mary is secure in replying. Although Jack's original message was not secure
because his public key is freely available, if he needed to send Mary a secure message, he could use her
public key to encrypt the message. This would ensure that only Mary could decode the message.
25. See Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, III, Electronic Commerce Legislation: From
Written on Paper and Signed in Ink to Electronic Records and Online Authentication, 53 Bus. LAwYHR
307, 311 (1997).
26. See Greenwood, supra note 20.
27. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 25, at 312.
28. See id. Additicnally, digital signatures use a "one way hash function." This means the content
of the message cannot be derived from the message digest, thereby further ensuring the message's
integrity.
29. See Greenwood, supra note 20.
30. CAs are also called cyber-notaries. See infra notes 1.75-78 and accompanying text (discussing
cyber-notaries and electronic notarization).
31. The CA must also be trustworthy. Therefore, most digital signature statutes provide for the
licensing of CAs. C& must comply with certain minimum standards before issuing a certificate.
Moreover, the CA will generally have its own certificate issued by a higher authority. Under a typical
statutory scheme, the higher CA is a state official, such as the Secretary of State.
32. See Biddle, supra note 17.
33. The database lists the identity of the holder and posts information about the certificate such as
whether the certificate has been lost or stolen. It is the recipients responsibility to check the online
database, but after doing this, the recipient is assured of the identity of the sender. See Commonwealth




technology is complex, it is transparent to the user; software programs will perform
most of the verification functions automatically.'
2. Biometrics
Biometric methods offer another form of electronic signatures that promise a high
level of security. Biometrics, unlike digital signatures, does not rely on authen-
tication but instead relies on proof of identification." Biometrics involves
measuring and recognizing some unique biological aspect of, or physical act
performed by, a particular human being. Examples of biometric technologies
include fingerprint imaging,"' voice recognition,' retina scanning, facial recog-
nition, and PenOp 9
PenOp deserves particular attention because with PenOp a user actually signs a
document. Signing involves the use of a stylus on a digitizer pad. The digitizer pad
analyzes nearly 100 separate biometric measures of signature behavior such as
stroke direction, speed, pressure, and accelerationm' These measurements are
bundled into a "biometric token" that provides evidentiary information for
comparison against future signatures!' PenOp thereby provides a great deal of
security against fraud and forgery while retaining the ceremonial aspects of a
traditional signing.42
Despite the level of technology involved, biometric techniques are actually quite
practical in many settings and are no longer cost prohibitive under a variety of
circumstances. For example, PenOp software costs only a few hundred dollars
Signatures (visited July 10, 1998) <http://www.state.ma.usitd/legal/crypto-3.htm> (on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review).
34. See Greenwood, supra note 20.
35. See Use of Biometrics to Verify Transfers: Hearings on Biometrics and the Future of Money
Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking
and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Lisa A. Broderick, CEO, PenOp, Inc.)
[hereinafter Broderick].
36. See Making Purchases Electronically, 1998: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on
Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House Committee on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement
of Kirk LeCompte, Director of Product Marketing, PenOp, Inc.) [hereinafter LeCompte].
37. New biometric techniques guard against "latent image" attacks, such as lifting a fingerprint off
an object touched by another person and then transferring that image to a fingerprint reader. To prevent
this, fingerprint readers employ various "fake finger" detection devices. One method actually scans the
finger using a color of light near the infrared range. This technique will reject any "finger" that is not
the same color as the user's finger. This method also reads subcutaneous capillary patterns that prevent
the use of a wax finger or a dead finger. See Robert R. Jueneman & R.J. Robertson, Jr., Biometrics and
Digital Signatures in Electronic Commerce, 38 JtURIMETRICS J. 427, 450 (1998).
38. Voice recognition records a sample of a person's voice and subjects it to speaker recognition
algorithms that are based on an analysis of the frequency spectrum of speaking certain words. Frequency
spectrums differ greatly among different persons speaking the same word in the same pitch and
intonation. See id. at 449.




43. See Use of Biometrics to Verify Transactions: Hearings on Biometrics and the Future of Money
1999]
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and the digitizer pads are priced at less than fifty dollars." Biometrics also offers
the advantage of quick and secure verification of a person's identity in routine
transactions. Further, finger imaging, voice recognition and PenOp technologies can
be installed on a home computer, and retina scanning or finger imaging could
replace the use of PINs at ATM machines, while smart cards containing biometric
information could be used in place of credit cards, debit cards or driver's licenses.4s
III. Leg:slation and the Existing Status of Electronic Writing
and Signature Exclusions
A. The Electronic Records and Signatures Act of 1998
One of the professed purposes of the Oklahoma Act is to "eliminate barriers to
electronic commerce transactions resulting from uncertainties relating to writing and
signature requirements."'  The uncertainties referred to are namely whether
electronic signatures are legally enforceable and whether electronic records are the
legal equivalent of paper documents. The Oklahoma Act affirmatively answers these
questions by giving full legal effect to electronic writings and signatures.
The Oklahoma Act provides that "[a] record shall not be denied legal effect,
vilidity, or enforceability solely because it is in the form of an electronic record." '47
Accordingly, whenever a law requires a "written" record, or provides consequences
when it is not, electronic records satisfy the requirement." The Act, however, does
not purport to change the substantive law governing writings. If a rule of law
requires a writing to contain a minimum substantive content, the legal effect and
enforceability of an electronic record will still depend on whether the record meets
those substantive nluirements.49 The Oklahoma Act merely prevents a record from
Before the Subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking
and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Clinton C. Fuller, Chief Operating Officer, The
National Registry, Inc.).
44. See Philip S. Corwin, Digital Signatures and Signature Dynamics: Some Issues to Consider, 17
no. 9 BANKING POLY REP. I, 15 (1998). Another cost saving advantage of biometric methods is that
the party using them acts as its own certification authority, thereby obviating the need for trusted third
parties.
45. See id. at 14-15.
46. 15 OKLA. STATr. § 961 (Supp. 1998).
47. Id. § 964.
48. See idU
49. For example, a general warranty deed must include certain covenants. If the Oklahoma Act
covered deeds, it would not alter the substantive rule requiring the inclusion of these covenants. The
ETA also does not purport to alter substantive law. The Drafting Committee has emphasized that the
ETA is "fundamentally a procedural statute to validate and effectuate transactions accomplished through
an electronic medium , . . the Committee has indicated its intent to leave [substantive questions] to
resolution under the substantive law applicable to a given transaction." U.E.T.A. Prefatory Note (Draft
July 24-31, 1998); see also U.E.T.A. Prefatory Note 2(B) (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999) ("The continued
adherence to the fundamental premise of the Act as minimalist and procedural continued .... The Act's
treatment of records and signatures demonstrates best the minimalist approach that has been adopted.");
U.E.T.A. § 103(d) (Finl Draft July 23-30, 1999) ("A transaction subject to this [Act] is also subject to




being rendered ineffectual on the sole ground that it is in an electronic format.
The Oklahoma Act's treatment of signatures is virtually identical. The Oklahoma
Act reads that "[a] signature shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enfor-
ceability solely because it is in the form of an electronic signature."' The form of
a signature, however, may not be the only reason to deny its effectiveness. Again,
any signature must meet substantive legal requirements. Thus, substantive law still
governs questions concerning intent or authenticity.
B. Scope of the Electronic Records and Signature Act
The Oklahoma Legislature enacted the Oklahoma Act in order to facilitate and
promote commercial transactions by validating and authorizing the use of electronic
records and electronic signatures."' To this end, the Oklahoma Act applies to
"electronic records and electronic signatures generated, stored, processed,
communicated, or used for any purpose in any transaction."' The Oklahoma Act,
however, does not apply to all transactions. It contains four important exclusions:
(1) rules of law relating to the creation or execution of a will; (2) rules of law
relating to the creation, performance, or enforcement of an indenture, declaration of
trust, or power of attorney; (3) rules of law relating to a mortgage, conveyance,
surface and mineral lease, right-of-way, and easement of real property; and (4)
"rules of law which expressly require a written record when the application of [the
Oklahoma Act] would cause a result which is inconsistent with the intent as
expressed by the rule of law.' 3 This last provision is commonly referred to as a
''repugnancy" provision.
Further, the Oklahoma Act contains language which provides that a transaction
subject to the Oklahoma Act is also subject to the UCCM and consumer protection
laws.5 In the case of a conflict between the Oklahoma Act and a rule of law
contained in consumer protection provisions or the UCC, the latter rules govern.
Thus, whenever such a rule calls for a writing or signature, a strict reading of the
Oklahoma Act could produce the result of excluding many of these provisions.
C. Survey of Other State Laws'
To date, every state except North Dakota has enacted some form of legislation
addressing electronic records and electronic or digital signatures. A cursory
50. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 965 (Supp. 1998).
51. See id. § 961.
52. Id. § 963(A) (emphasis added).
53. Id. § 963 (emphasis added); see also infra note 68. The Oklahoma Act also excludes certain
state codes relating to persons licensed as professional land surveyors, professional engineers, architects
and landscape architects. See id. § 963(4).
54. The UCC is codified in title 12A of the Oklahoma Statutes. Because title 12A varies little from
the UCC, all references herein will be to the 1995 official text of the UCC and not to title 12A.
55. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 963(C) (Supp. 1998).
56. This discussion is current as of August 1999. Because of the rapid changes in this area, many
laws may have been enacted since publication of this comment. For a frequently updated survey of state
laws, see <http.//www.mbc.comecommerce.html>.
1999]
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examination of these laws is insightful for several reasons. First, it furnishes insight
into the legislative mindset concerning what areas of the law conflict with electronic
mediums. Second, it provides a sense of the direction taken by different states.
Lastly, it highlights the lack of uniformity in this area. 7
Currently, thirrj-five states have laws permitting the use of electronic sig-
natures" and another fourteen states authorize only digital signatures," Of the
57. The Committee on the Law of Commerce in Cyberspace of the Business Law Section of the
American Bar Association recently issued a recommendation calling for uniform state laws. The
Committee cited compliance difficulties, inefficiencies, and highercosts of automated solutions as reasons
for a uniform approach. See Comm. on the Law of Commerce in Cyberspace, Bus. Law Section, ABA,
Proposal for Study: The Need for Uniform Law on Electronic Record.Keeping and Document Retention
(visited July 10, 1998) <httpillwww.abanet.orglbuslaw/yberlarchivejrupdate.html> (on file with the
Oklahwma Law Review). This, however, is not the present state of the law. No uniformity exists among
the states, the federal government, or the bodies that have promulgated uniform rules.
Three uniform proposals exist: the ETA; the United Nations' UNCITRAL Model on Electronic
Commerce (UNCITRAL); and the American Bar Association's Digital Signature Guidelines (Digital
Signature Guidelines). None of these proposals are in accord with one another. The ETA gives effect
to all electronic signatures as does UNCITRAL, yet the ETA is meant to be procedural while
UNCITRAL includes various substantive law portions and presumptions. The Digital Signature
Guidelines, on the other hand, call for digital signatures. Other works that impact electronic writings and
signatures include proposed article 2, draft article 2A, and draft article 2B.
The federal stance i!; also difficult to determine. Much federal legislation has been drafted to address
electronic or digital signatures, yet many of these bills are neither comprehensive nor consistent. See
Millennium Digital Commerce Act, S.761, 106th Cong. (1999); Government Paperwork Elimination Act,
S. 2107, 105th Cong. (1997); Digital Signature and Electronic Enhancement Act, S. 1594, 105th Cong.
(1997); Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1997, S. 376, 105th Cong.; Computer Security
Enhancement Act of 1997, H.R. 1903,105th Cong.; Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of 1997,
H.R. 2937, 105th Cong.; Electronic Commerce Enhancement Act, H.R. 2991, 105th Cong.; Internal
Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong.; Security and Freedom Through
Encryption (SAFE) Act of 1997, H.R. 695, 105th Cong.; Secure Public Networks Act, S. 909, 105th
Cong.; Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of 1997, H.R. 2937, 105th Cong.; Medical
Information Privacy and Security Act, S. 1368. 105th Cong.; Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the
Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act of 1997, 105th Cong.; Data Privacy Act of 1997, 105th Cong.
58. See ALA. CODS § 40-3-1 (1997); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 6.05,9.25, 10.06, 10.15, 10.20, 10.50,32.05,
32.11, 34.45, 40.21, 45.50 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-121 (1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-
132 (1999); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25612.5 (West Supp. 1998); CAL GOVt CODE § 16.5 (West Supp.
1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-413 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19(a)-25a (1997); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 2706(a) (1997); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5924(a) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.70 (West
1999); FLA. STAT. ANiq. § 117.20 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-1 (Supp. 1999); HAw. REV.
STAT. 14 § 23 1-8.5 (Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-140 (Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 67-2351 (Supp.
1999); 5 ILL. COMp. STAT. 175 (1999); IOWA CODE § 155A.27 (Supp. 1999); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
40.2145 (West Supp. 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A §§ 1401, 1405, 1410 (1997); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-15-404 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.75 (Anderson Supp. 1998); 15 OKLA. STAT. §
960 (Supp. 1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.825 (Supp. 1998); R.l. GEN. LAws § 42-127-1 (1998); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-3-105, 29-2-101 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 1154 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
467 (1998); W. VA. CODE § 39-17-30 (1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-2501 (Michie Supp. 1999); 1999
Ark. H.B. 1021; S.B. 431, 139th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (Del. 1997); S.B. 961, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997);
H.B. 708, Ky. 1998 Reg. Sess.; H.B. 1126,89th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998); S.B. 42,69th
Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1997); A.B. 2179, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998); N.C. Sess. Laws 127; S.B. 2071, 55th Leg.
Assembly (N.D. 1997), S.B. 1385, 182d Gen. Assembly (Penn. 1997); A.B. 811, 93rd Reg. Sess. (Wis.




thirty-five states allowing electronic signatures, only twelve, including Oklahoma,
have broad legislation covering all transactions.' The remaining states limit the
applicability of the laws to areas such as electronic filings of tax returns, UCC
financing statements, court documents, or the use of medical records." Of the
twelve states whose laws cover all transactions, five statutes contain a repugnancy
clause, five expressly exclude negotiable instruments, four exclude wills and trusts,
four exclude conveyances of real property, and four contain no exclusions.'
D. The ETA Approach
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act drafts illustrate well the difficulty in
determining appropriate exclusions. Indeed, the Reporter for the ETA drafts
stated that defining the scope of the Act was the most difficult aspect of the drafting
process.' The changes the ETA experienced in its drafts reflect the divisiveness
of this issue. The initial August 1997 draft listed specific exclusions for (1) wills;
(2) transfers, deposits, and withdrawals of money or credit; (3) indentures,
declarations of trust, and powers of attorney; and (4) conveyances of real
property.' Additionally, some expressed a sentiment at that time that the ETA
should cover only contractual transactions, while others stated that such an approach
would be too limiting.' The drafters, however, adopted an intermediary position,
<http://www.magnet.state.ma.uslitd/legal/esigs.html>.
59. See IND. CODE ANN. 5 § 24 (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2610 (Supp. 1997); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 25-63-1 (Supp. 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-1701 (Michie Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-15.2 (Michie Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-5-10 (Law Co-op 1999); TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.108 (West Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (Supp. 1998); WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.34 (1999); Digital Signature Pilot Program, 198 Md. Laws 482; 1998 MINN. LAWS 321; 1997
N.H. LAWS 22; S.B. 2204, 89th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998); S.B. 2238,220th Annual Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1997).
60. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia.
61. For example, Alabama limits the use of electronic records to the filing of tax returns. Arizona,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wyoming permit the electronic filing of any document
submitted to the Secretary of State. Colorado limits electronic filings to UCC financing statements, while
Connecticut and Louisiana have legislation pertaining to medical records. Other states such as Hawaii
and Nevada permit the electronic filing of court documents. Maine's law is limited to applications
required under its Motor Vehicle Code and Iowa's legislation is similarly limited to voter registration
applications. Idaho limits the applicability of its statute to writings and signatures contained in the Idaho
Business Corporation Act. See also PEB Commentary No. 15, Electronic Filing Under Article 9 (July
1996).
62. The Iowa, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Massachusetts and South Carolina laws contain repugnancy
clauses and exclusions for negotiable instruments; the Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, and Oklahoma laws
exclude wills, trusts and conveyances of real property; and the Georgia, Tennessee, Virginia, and West
Virginia statutes do not contain any exclusions.
63. See supra note 13 (discussing the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act).
64. See U.E.T.A. § 103 rptr. n.2 (Draft Nov. 25, 1997) (stating the scope "is perhaps the single most
difficult aspect in the drafting of this Act"); see also Reporter's Memorandum from Ben Beard, Report
to the Electronic Transactions Act Drafting Committee and Observers 2 (Nov. 25, 1997).
65. See U.E.T.A. § 105 (Draft Aug. 15, 1997).
66. See Reporter's Memorandum from Ben Beard, Report to the Electronic Transactions Act Drafting
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settling on expanding the coverage to commercial transactions. Nevertheless, the
Drafting Committee ultimately abandoned language limiting the ETA to solely
commercial transactions, thereby expanding the act's coverage to all transactions. 7
The next draft dramatically parted from the August Draft, deleting the specified
exclusions in favor of a repugnancy clause.' The repugnancy provision's existence
was short lived - the Drafting Committee voted to delete the provision at its next
meeting in favor of again defining specific carve-outs.' The principle reason
advanced by the drafters for this change was that defining carve-outs eliminates
ambiguity and thereby encourages parties to engage in electronic transactions."
The drafters believed that a repugnancy clause would leave parties wondering if
their transactions were covered, and thus parties would choose not to use an
electronic medium.7' A task force was therefore formed to review state laws and
make recommendations to the Drafting Committee on areas of state law which
should be excluded from the ETA."
The Task Force. on State Law Exclusions (Task Force) issued its first report in
September 1998, recommending the exclusion of wills, codicils, and testamentary
trusts." The Report advocated the inclusion of transfers of real property, inter
vivos trusts, powers of attorney, and subject to delivery requirements, consumer
protection statutes.7 4 The Task Force reserved judgment on negotiable instruments,
calling for further study on the issue." The Task Force continued to adhere to the
position that a repugnancy clause is undesirable because of the uncertainty it creates.
The Report stated that "[t]he object of the UETA is to promote certainty; to permit
businesses to employ electronic records and new signature technologies with
confidence. The ambiguity and judicial discretion inherent in a 'repugnancy'
standard may significantly impede that goal."'76 The Report therefore concluded
that, in the interest of enhancing certainty, an exclusionary list should recommend
specific statutes far exclusion and identify other areas of law that states should
consider for exclu:;ion on a case-by-case basis. The March 1999 draft did just that;
Committee and Observers 3 (Aug. 15, 1997); Drafting Committee Meeting Report 4 (Sept. 19-21, 1997)
(available at <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/septrpt.html>).
67. See Drafting Committee Meeting Report 9 (Jan. 9-11, 1998) (accessible at <http://www.
webcom.comllegaled/ETAForumljan98rpt.html>).
68. U.E.T.A. § IN. rptr. n.2 states that:
This general ex.:lusion is intended as a broad "catch-all" to assure that where a rule of law
manifests a clear intent for a paper writing or an ink on paper signature it will not be
overridden by this Act. In the commercial context, where the parties have not imposed
such an ink on paper requirement, it is difficult to think of a law which would require ink
on paper.
U.E.T.A. § 104 rptr. n,2 (Draft Nov. 25, 1997).
69. See Drafting Committee Meeting Report, supra note 67, at 10.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See U.E.T.A. § 103 rptr. n.3 (Draft July 24-31, 1998).
73. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(B)-(C) (Sept. 21, 1998).
74. See id. § 5(C)-(E), (H).
75. See id. § 5(A).




it specifically excluded wills, codicils, testamentary trusts, and certain UCC
provisions.' The final draft retained these exclusions."' The Reporter's Notes to
the final draft also lists additional laws that states may wish to exclude.
Unfortunately, this approach could have adverse effects. Initially, an exclusionary
list may result in overly broad exclusions, thereby stifling the growth of electronic
commerce. Further, specifying every exclusion will prove impossible. Moreover,
existing business practices demonstrate that electronic commerce can and will
proceed without legal protection. That parties will proceed in the face of legal
uncertainty can best be seen by looking at the area where, at present, there is
perhaps the most legal uncertainty - contracts for the sale of goods over the
Internet.' Despite their clouded legal status, these transactions are growing at an
exponential rate and it is estimated that trade on the Internet could total anywhere
between $200 billion to $1.5 trillion in the year 2000." This exposes an arguable
flaw in the drafters' reasoning. If parties are willing to proceed without any legal
protection, it is difficult to imagine that they would cease their existing practices
once there is a possibility that those transactions will be enforceable.' Of course,
greater certainty is a reason for codification, as it reduces the cost of transactions
that will occur.'
A related and potentially greater concern is under-inclusiveness. Indeed, the ETA
is minimalist in its enunciated exclusions. It is difficult to imagine, however, that
of the thousands of writing and signature requirements contained in a state's statutes,
so few are worthy of exclusion. Of course, it cannot be expected that all of these
potentially incompatible laws will be uncovered, yet that is the reason for
questioning the ETA's lack of a repugnancy clause. Such a clause acts as a safe-
guard against inadvertent inclusion of writing and signature requirements.
Another problem with stopping at defining specific exclusions is that it will
inevitably exclude "marginal" transactions - the transactions that under certain
77. See U.E.T.A. § 103 (Draft Mar. 19, 1999).
78. See U.E.T.A. § 103 (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999).
79. See U.E.T.A. § 103 cmt. 2. (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999) (listing five types of laws states may
wish to exclude). A potential problem with this approach is that it actually promotes a lack of
uniformity; many states may act on the suggested exclusions while others do not, leaving a confused state
of coverage among jurisdictions.
80. See generally Juan Andres Avellan V., John Hancock in Borderless Cyberspace: The Cross-
Jurisdictional Validity of Electronic Signatures and Certificates in Recent Legislative Text, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 301 (1998); Richard Allan Homing, Has Hal Signed a Contract: The Statute of Frauds
in Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTrER & HIGH TEcH. LJ. 253 (1996); R.J. Robertson, Jr.,
Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the Statute of Frauds, 49 S.C. L. REV. 787 (1998); Marc E.
Szafran, A Neo-Jnstitutional Paradigm for Contracts Formed in Cyberspace: Judgement Day for the
Statute of Frauds, 14 CARDoZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 491 (1996); Deborah L. Wilkerson, Electronic
Commerce Under the U.C.C. Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds: Are Electronic Messages Enforceable?,
41 U. KAN. L. REV. 403 (1992).
81. See Hearings on Electronic Commerce Before the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.
(1998) (testimony of Richard A. Shaffer, Principal, Technologic Partners).
82. Cf. Benjamin Wright, Legislative and Regulatory Law and Policy Issues (visited Aug. 29, 1998)
<http.//www.state.ma.usitd/legal/esigs.htm>.
83. These costs include litigation expenses and enforcement costs concomitant with transfers.
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circumstances are consistent with existing writing and signature requirements but
under other circumstances are repugnant. The remainder of this comment argues
that some of these excluded transactions should be covered, and conversely, other
statutes which are covered should not be affected by the Oklahoma Act. This
comment is based on the assumption that laws should be excluded only when an
electronic medium fails to satisfy that law's purpose in requiring a writing or
signature: when it is repugnant. The premise is straightforward: if a law can be
conclusively detemined as repugnant, it should be excluded; however, if it cannot
be so adjudged, it should not be specifically exempted. While the premise is simply
stated, it is difficult to make such clear assessments of repugnancy. The next section
demonstrates this difficulty.
The analysis first examines the purposes of writing and signature requirements
and then applies those principles to various statutes, beginning by tackling the
legislative assumptions regarding wills and real property conveyances. This analysis
will further illustrate that an electronic medium may satisfy the traditional purposes
of writings and signatures in some situations but not in others, and also demon-
strates that devising a comprehensive list of specific exclusions is an impossible
task. While a few statutes can easily be excluded, electronic signature legislation
must contain a repugnancy clause to cover the marginal transaction. Simply
excluding these transactions will stem the growth of the electronic marketplace."'
IV. Repugnancy? Assessing the Purposes of Writing and Signature Requirements
and Electronic Media's Ability to Satisfy those Purposes
A. Determining the Meaning of Repugnancy in an Electronic World
Repugnance is generally defined as the relationship of contrary terms or an
inconsistency.' A repugnancy clause in an electronic writing and signature statute
simply means that the statute's provisions should be inapplicable to laws calling for
a writing or signature when the intent behind those requirements cannot be met by
an electronic medium 6
Every definition, however, to be meaningful, must be examined in context.
Context has many components and varies depending on the speaker, the listener,
and geography. Likewise, time frame is an element of context. Laws must be
interpreted with reference to this temporal context, lest they become rigid and
outdated. As England's Justice Stephen stated in 1885:
Laws ought to be adjusted to the habits of society, and not to aim at
remoulding them . ... Custom, and what is called common sense,
regulate the great mass of human transactions. If.. . the law deviates
from these guiding principles, it becomes a nuisance. If you require
84. Indeed, at one meeting, the drafters seemingly came to a similar conclusion. See U.E.T.A. § 104
rptr. note (Draft Sept. 18, 1998).
85. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE ICHIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New College ed.
1980).




people to take precautions which they feel to be practically unnecessary,
and which are alien to their habits of life, the only practical result is
that they will prefer the risk of the penalties of neglect to the nuisance
of taking the precaution."
It is only in the context of modem society, comprised of current attitudes,
practices, and technologies, that the meaning of a word can truly be assessed. Blind
adherence to traditions and formalities that do not comport with current practices
will only encourage parties to ignore those laws and entrench inefficiencies.
Accordingly, lawmakers must be keen to the attitudes existing in modem society
when making determinations of repugnancy.
B. The Analytical Framework for Determining Repugnancy
An electronic medium is inconsistent with an existing writing or signature
requirement when it fails to satisfy the purposes behind that requirement. Therefore,
the purposes of writings and signatures must be assessed. There are two definitive
articles examining the functions of writing and signature requirements in relation to
statutes of frauds: Professor Fuller's Form and Consideration and Professor Perillo's
The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form.s
While these articles examine writing requirements in reference only to statutes of
frauds, the functions described are applicable to writings and signatures in general.
Furthermore, these statutes are undoubtedly the most recognized writing re-
quirements and therefore provide a good benchmark for examining a writing's
functions, but the benefits described herein are not limited to the statutes of frauds.
1. The Evidentiary Function
Both Professors Fuller and Perillo identify the evidentiary function as the most
important function served by a writing requirement.' The evidentiary function was
the principle reason for enacting An Act for Prevention of Frauds & Perjuries,
commonly known as the original Statute of Frauds.' As the name indicates, the
Statute had as its purpose the prevention of fraud and subornation of perjury.9 It
was believed that some contracts were so important as to warrant their reduction to
writing.' A writing arguably provided parties and the courts with clear and
interpretable evidence that an agreement may have been reached, and signatures
provided an indication that parties assented to the terms of the agreement 3
87. James J. O'Conell, Jr., Boats Against the Current: The Courts and the Statute of Frauds, 47
EMORY L.J. 253, 255 (1998) (quoting James Fitzjames Stephen & Frederick Pollock, Section 17 of the
Statute of Frauds, 1 L.Q. REv. 1, 6 (1885)).
88. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUMi. L. REv. 799 (1941); Perillo, supra note 3.
89. See Fuller, supra note 88, at 800; Perillo, supra note 3, at 64.
90. See An Act for Prevention of Frauds & Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2 (Eng).
91. See Crawford D. Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds and Their Authors, 61
U. PA. L. REv. 283, 285 (1913); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 cmt. (1979).
92. See Homing, supra note 80, at 268.
93. It should not be overlooked that legislators made an assumption concerning the evidentiary value
of electronic records. See U.E.T.A. § 112 (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999) ("In a legal proceeding,
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Signatures also seved the evidentiary function by authenticating documents and
identifying the parties to a writing.
The evidentiary function continues to serve these purposes and remains the
primary rationale for many writing and signature requirements. This holds true
outside of the Statute of Frauds context as well, as the evidentiary function is a
widespread purpose promoted by a substantial number of writing and signature
requirements.
2. The Cautionary Function
Another significant function of writings and signatures is the cautionary function.
This function has been described as a guard against arbitrary actionY Essentially,
by entering into a formal agreement, parties are reminded of the legal significance
of their actions. Because formalities create greater expectations by the parties than
would otherwise be created by an oral promise, a writing "cautions" parties to
deliberate on the consequences of their actions."
3. The Channeling Function
Writing requirements often dictate more than words on paper; they require certain
words, in a specific order or in a particular format. The benefits derived from these
requirements are d..emed the channeling or classifying function. Parties "channel"
their agreement into a writing. "In this aspect form offers ... channels for the
legally effective expression of intention."' Parties are encouraged to adopt a
mechanism for manifesting their intentions that will be readily understandable by
the courts. Often, a writing is such a mechanism. For example, a Form 1040
facilitates the processing of tax returns and ensures the Internal Revenue Service
receives necessary information. A check, a job application, and a certificate of
incorporation are other common examples of instruments that serve the channeling
function.
In the context of contract formation, channeling also helps distinguish between
negotiations and agreements. Signatures indicate at what point the parties have
passed the negotiation stage and actually formed a contract. Professor Perillo argues
that to some extent a writing performs this delineation.' However, because
multiple writings or memoranda satisfy the Statute of Frauds, a writing alone does
not necessarily perform this function.
4. The Clarifying Function
The clarifying function constitutes another benefit derived from writing
requirements. When parties write an agreement, they may discover points of
evidence of an electronic record or electronic signature may not be excluded because it is an electronic
record or electronic signature or it is not an original or is not in its original form.").
94. See Fuller, supra note 88, at 800; see also Perillo, supra note 3, at 53.
95. See Perillo, supra note 3, at 53.
96. Fuller, supra note 88, at 801.




contention or consider issues not previously discussed in the course of an oral
exchange.9' Although a writing does not compel the parties to address these issues, -
at a minimum it forces the parties to recognize their existence.
The above four functions do not comprise an exhaustive list.' They do,
however, account for a significant portion of the functions served by all writing and
signature requirements. It is essential, however, to distinguish between the functions
of writings and signatures and the purposes for writing and signature requirements.
The functions of a law are the benefits that flow from the writing or signature
requirements, whereas purposes refer to the reasons for passing a law, i.e., to
provide the contemplated benefits. Only when a legislature enacted a law with the
intent of generating certain benefits do those benefits become purposes. All other
benefits derived from the law are surplus. This distinction is important because if
an electronic format is repugnant to a legal requirement, it is only because it fails
to satisfy the purposes of that statute and not because it fails to adequately generate
the surplus benefits associated with a requirement.
Additionally, if the existence of a writing or signature is beneficial to parties, they
will be compelled to adopt a measure designed to create these benefits, regardless
of a legal imposition. Professor Fuller recognized this proposition, stating:
[Tihe need for investing a particular transaction with some legal
formality will depend upon the extent to which the guarantees that the
formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces native to the
situation out of which the transaction arises - including in these
"forces" the habits and conceptions of the transacting parties.'"
Thus, to some extent, the need to ensure that electronic formats are consistent with
existing requirements is mitigated by the fact that the parties will adopt a writing
or signature when it is in their best interest to do so.
C. Application of Statutory Purposes to Electronic Formats
It is beyond the scope of this comment to examine even a fraction of the writing
and signature requirements contained in the Oklahoma Statutes. Indeed, a study
conducted by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts revealed over 4500 references
to the words "write," "writing," "sign," "signed," and "signature" in the Mas-
sachusetts statutes."' Nevertheless, an examination of a few statutes illustrates the
98. See id. at 56-57.
99. For example, Professor Perillo also identifies a sacramental function, a managerial function,
a publicity function, an educational function, a regulatory function, and a taxation function. See id. at
43-48, 58-64.
100. Fuller, supra note 88, at 805 (emphasis deleted). In a similar vein, it is arguable that parties
value efficiency over legal certainty given the growth of electronic commerce prior to legal recognition
of many such transactions.
101. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 25, at 308 n.7. This estimate may actually be small.
The Ohio Super-Computer Center identified over 8212 provisions with writing and signature
requirements contained in the Ohio Statutes and a similar search in Georgia revealed over 5500 such
provisions. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § IV (Sept. 21, 1998).
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methodology of determining repugnancy, beginning with two types of laws
repeatedly exclude l from state electronic writing and signature legislation: wills and
laws relating to real property.
1. Wills
Valid attested wills traditionally require (1) a writing; (2) signed by the testator;
and (3) attested by credible witnesses." Oklahoma further requires that testators
"publish" their wills by declaring to witnesses that the writing is a will and also
requires that testators sign at their end of the wills." The details of these
requirements vary from state to state. These variations are attributable to the fact
that some states adopted the Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.) approach, while others
retained the requirements originating from either the Statute of Frauds, 1677 or the
Wills Act of 1837."
The Statute of Frauds, 1677 provided:
All devises and bequests of any lands . . . shall be in writing, and
signed by the party so devising the same, or by some other person in
his presence and by his express directions, and shall be attested and
subscribed in the presence of the said devisor by three or four credible
witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and of none effect."
The Wills Act of 1837, similarly stated:
No Will shal be valid unless it shall be in writing and executed in
manner hereinafter mentioned; it shall be signed at the Foot or End
thereof by the Testator, or by some other Person in his Presence and by
his Direction- and such signature shall be made or acknowledged by the
Testator in the Presence of Two or more Witnesses present at the same
Time, and such Witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the Will in the
Presence of the Testator, but no Form of Attestation shall be neces-
sary.0
6
These requirements are similar in many respects to the requirements for some
contracts and other transactions, but few areas of law require as much formality in
execution as wills. Moreover, with wills, traditionally there has been little
flexibility, and minor technical violations invalidate a will."n Wills therefore
102. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 33.1 (1977); see also 84 OKLA. STAT. § 55 (1991) (requiring a written will to be subscribed in the
presence of witnesses, rublished by the testator, and signed by the attesting witnesses).
103. See 84 Oia.A. STAT. § 55 (1991). This statute further requires the subscription or ack-
nowledgment be made in the presence of two or more witnesses who must also sign at the end of the
will while in the testato's presence and at the testator's direction.
104. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 169 (2d ed. 1997).
105. An Act for Prevention of Fraud and Pejuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (Eng.).
106. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will 4 & I Vict., ch. 26 (Eng.).
107. See, e.g., Burns v. Adamson, 854 S,W.2d 723, 723-24 (Ark. 1993) (holding the testator must




provide a good starting point for an analysis of the applicability of writing and
signature requirements outside of the Statute of Frauds context.
The formal requirements for wills have been described as serving four distinct
purposes, three of which were previously discussed." Professor John Langbein,
drawing heavily from Professor Fuller's work, applied these functions to wills. He
proffered that the statutory formalities serve an evidentiary function, a channeling
function, a cautionary function and a protective function."
The primary purpose of will formalities is to provide reliable evidence of the
decedent's intent. The writing requirement serves the evidentiary function by
assuring that a testator's intent is expressed in a trustworthy and permanent form."'
A signature serves to provide evidence of genuineness. Signing at the end of the
will prevents subsequent inclusions,"' and the attestation requirement furthers the
evidentiary function by providing witnesses who later can prove the will."'
The second purpose described by Professor Langbein is the channeling function.
Channeling is of great importance in the will context because of the probate
process; unlike contracts, a court must examine every will. Having testators channel
their testamentary intent into a uniform format promotes judicial efficiency because
a court, when faced with a document, is certain of whether it is in fact a will."'
Furthermore, uniformity benefits testators by ensuring that their wishes will be
enforced when they follow the statutory formalities."4
Statutorily imposed rules also impress upon testators the legal significance of
their actions. This, of course, is the cautionary function. Since testators do not part
with property at the time of execution, a danger exists that they will make
dispositions without adequate reflection." ' Formalities impress upon testators the
seriousness and solemnity of writing a will and thereby provide an assurance that
a will actually represents testators' true intentions." ' The signature requirement
shows that testators adopted a will as final and evidences that the writing was not
will invalid when the decedent typed the will believing it to be more formal); Wilson v. Polite, 218 So.
2d 843, 850 (Miss. 1969) (stating a testators intent is not important if the statutory requirements are not
met); see also C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An
Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code "Harmless Error" Rule and the Movement Toward
Amorphism, 43 FLA. L. REv. 167 (1991).
108. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
109. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 489,492-
96 (1975). For a critique of the formalities of wills, see James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation
Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1990).
110. See Langbein, supra note 109, at 492-93.
111. Few states retain this requirement. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, § 33.1 stat. note
(1991). But see In re Proley, 422 A.2d 136 (Pa. 1980); In re Winter's Will, 98 N.Y.S.2d 312 (NY. App.
Div. 1950).
112. See Langbein, supra note 109, at 493,
113. See id. at 494.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 495.
116. See WAGGONER, supra note 104, at 169.
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a draft. The ceremonial requirement of attestation further stresses the legal
significance of executing a will."17
The statutes also promote a protective function."' This function is primarily
reliant on attestation. Witnessing execution, it is argued, prevents substitution of the
will with another document."9 In fact, however, witnessing is ineffectual in
preventing fraud." ' The comment to section 2-205 of the U.P.C. states that "[tihe
requirement of disinterested witnesses has not succeeded in preventing fraud and
undue influence; and in most cases of undue influence, the influencer is careful not
to sign as a witness, but to procure disinterested witnesses."'2' The utility of
attestation is further limited because fraud and undue influence may be proved by
other means.'" Futthermore, attestation is actually harmful in many circumstances
because failure to satisfy this requirement voids many otherwise effective wills for
a minor technical violation. "
While these aforementioned benefits are fully generated by attested wills, not all
wills must satisfy these traditional requirements. The most common example is a
holographic will.'"4 A holographic will is a will that is entirely handwritten, dated,
and signed by the testator." A key distinguishing feature of the holographic will
is that it need not be witnessed. Because a holographic will does not require
attestation, it obviously does not fulfill the protective function. In fact, it has been
argued that "[a] holographic will is obtainable by compulsion as easily as a ransom
note."" Furthermore, Professor Langbein argues that a holographic will is
inadequate to satisfy the channeling and cautionary functions.'27 This conclusion
only makes sense because statutes allowing holographic wills do not require a
particular form or mandate execution formalities.
Why then are holographic wills permissible? The answer is that a valid
holographic will satisfies the evidentiary function." The requirement that a will
be handwritten acts as a substitute for attestation because a large writing sample
provides more evidence of authenticity than a mere signature.' The conclusion
117. See Langbein, supra note 109, at 495.
118. Seeid. at 496,
119. See In re Weber, 387 P.2d 165, 170 (Kan. 1963).
120. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Clavsification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
LJ. 1 (1941).
121. UNIF. PROBAIE CODE § 2-505 (amended 1993).
122. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 120, at 9-13.
123. See, e.g., ht re Royal, 826 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1992) (en bane); Chase v. Kittredge, 93 Mass. (I I
Alien) 49, 64 (1865). But see In re Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991).
124. The other form is an oral or nuncupative will.
125. See 84 OKLA. STAT. § 54 (1991). But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (1990) (stating only
material portions of a holographic will need be handwritten).
126. Gulliver & Ti~son, supra note 120, at 14.
127. See Langbein, supra note 109, at 497; see also Lindgren, supra note 4, at 1031.
128. Oklahoma courts require strict compliance with statutory provisions governing holographic
wills. See Hooker v. Brxton, 284 P.2d 708, 710 (Okla. 1955); In re Paull's Estate, 254 P.2d 357, 359
(Okla. 1950); In re Rigsby, 843 P.2d 856, 858 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
129. See Langbein, supra note 109, at 493. Oklahoma requires a holographic will be entirely




to be drawn is that as long as a will satisfies the evidentiary function it should be
valid."n
Assuming the truth of the previous statement, wills should be permitted in an
electronic format if the evidentiary purpose is satisfied. Nevertheless, most
electronic records and signatures do not adequately advance the evidentiary function
because they do not provide the requisite level of reliability. Clearly, an electronic
record that does not employ a technological method designed to ensure authenticity
or verify identity does not evidence the genuineness of a writing.' But even
digital signatures, which provide significant assurances of authenticity and integrity,
are ill-suited to the creation of wills. This is because many electronic media security
methods are designed to protect against "external" threats; they do not protect, and
are not meant to protect against "internal" threats. Internal threats exist in the
creation of a record, whereas external threats are commonly the risks of alteration
after creation of a record.
A hypothetical example illustrates this distinction. Husband and Wife are a close
couple who have no secrets between them, including computer passwords. Assume
Wife dies intestate and Husband, who knows Wife's computer passwords, drafts and
"signs" a document that is purportedly Wife's will. Alternatively, suppose Husband
drafted a will on his home computer devising his property in a manner with which
Wife does not agree. Wife could simply log onto the computer under Husband's
name and alter the will. Or the situation may be that the couple are domestic
partners. One partner dies intestate and the other, knowing he cannot take under the
state's intestacy scheme, creates a false will. Such scenarios are endless.
It is reasonable to assume that often family members or close friends will know
a decedent's password or have some ability to access a decedent's encryption key.
Furthermore, it is only family members that challenge wills.3 ' These family
members constitute an "internal" source of fraud that digital signatures were not
designed to prevent.' Whenever a person can impersonate another party during
the making of a record, digital signatures and like technologies provide inadequate
security and are therefore unreliable. Accordingly, digital signatures do not satisfy
the evidentiary purpose of will formalities and are repugnant to the statutory re-
quirements. However, digital signatures are not the only method available.
Biometrics, another secure electronic method, provides the requisite degree of
reliability. Because biometrics focuses on identification and not authentication,
internal threats are eliminated. Moreover, biometric devices are actually more secure
supra note 125.
130. Of course, the validity of a will still depends on the absence of some other invalidating cause,
such as incapacity or undue influence.
131. A clear example of a method that lacks reliability would be a will drafted with a word
processing application and simply stored on a personal computer or diskette.
132. This is because the only persons who can challenge a will are those who can take under the
intestacy statutes and intestacy only recognizes relatives.
133. Digital signatures prevent modification of information after interception, not from inception.
See supra notes 23-24.
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than traditional methods of creating holographic wills." If courts accept a large
handwriting sample as sufficient evidence of identity, why not a retina scan or
fingerprint verification? It appears, therefore, that depending on the technology
involved, an electronic will could satisfy the evidentiary function and thus be a
suitable form of a holographic will."3
Methods such a3 PenOp, however, provide a greater degree of authenticity than
an entirely handwritten will and still allow parties to engage in a traditional
ceremony.'" Accordingly, if the testator used PenOp, the will could be a valid
attested will. The IPenOp signed will would satisfy the evidentiary function as well
as the cautionary, channeling, and protective functions. Nonetheless, such a will is
ineffective under the current statutory scheme.
A significant practical concern, however, involves the permanency of electronic
methods. Electronic media are sometimes improperly described as "archival." While
the 2000-year-old :Dead Sea Scrolls illustrate the longevity of paper documents, the
same cannot be said for records stored in an electronic format. The reported life of
information recorded on magnetic tapes and optical disks varies, but a frequently
cited life span is twenty to thirty years." Two significant factors contribute to the
shortened life of electronically recorded information: degradation of the recording
media itself and technological obsolescence. Degradation manifests itself in a
variety of ways. Dae to the physical and chemical makeup of electronic media, they
are subject to ac.-idental erasure by magnetic fields, recording over existing
information, print-through, and media wear.' The second factor, technological
obsolescence, simply refers to the fact that many methods are replaced by newer
technologies.3 And while a large percentage of transactions do not need
documents to be retained for twenty years, in those instances in which a permanent
record is important, the longevity of electronic methods is a significant concern.
Wills provide a clemr example of an area in which there is a need for durability.
Nevertheless, the highly formalistic and ceremonial will requirements can be
satisfied by electronic media in certain circumstances, the variable being the
technology employed." Electronic methods are therefore not inherently repugnant
to statutes prescribflng will formalities; instead, inconsistency is dependent upon the
nature of the electronic writing and signature. Yet, a blanket exclusion that
precludes testator; from utilizing acceptable electronic methods denies the
134. See generally Jueneman & Robertson, supra note 37.
135. Of course, the practical consideration of costs plays a role in determining the ultimate utility
of such an alternative. Given the high cost of having an attorney draft even a simple attested will,
biometrics could be a cost-saving option as well.
136. See Brodericl:, supra note 35,
137. See William Saffady, Stability, Care andHandling ofMicroforms, Magnetic Media and Optical
Disks, 33 LIBR. TEcH. REP. 645 (1997); Phillips Business Information, Document Life Cycles Drive
Storage Needs, 7 DocuMENT IMAGINa REP. 7 (1997).
138. See Saffady, supra note 137.
139. The Sony Be~anax and eight-track cassettes are examples of technologies that suffered this
fate.
140. For a discussion of the viability of video wills, see Ronald K. L. Collins & David M, Skover,




effectuation of a decedent's testamentary intent without regard to the reliability of
the method adopted, even when these methods may provide more reliable evidence
than traditional ink on paper.'
4
'
The ETA Drafting Committee, nonetheless, has opted to exclude will and codicils
based on the Task Force on State Law Exclusions' recommendation. The Task
Force concluded that the ceremonial features of wills laws are not readily achievable
using an electronic form and that their exclusion would not have a "significant[ly]
adverse impact on commerce." 42 There are two significant reasons to question the
Task Force's reasoning. First, the Task Force appears to have overlooked the import
of holographic wills. Although this comment concurs in the conclusion that
electronic methods do not readily lend themselves to satisfaction of the ceremonial
function, it also points out that the ceremonial function is served only by attested
wills. By allowing holographic wills, lawmakers implicitly stated that ceremony is
not always necessary. Simply excluding all wills because electronic media do
not promote the ceremonial function overlooks this contention. It also assumes that
it is impossible to have a ceremony using electronic media, and this too, as PenOp
demonstrates, is not necessarily true. As to the second justification forwarded by
the Task Force, a law's impact on commerce bears no relevance to an electronic
form's ability to satisfy a formality's purpose.'" A de minimus impact on
commerce may lessen the effect of exclusion, but it is not a compelling reason for
exclusion. If it were a significant reason for exclusion, one must wonder why the
drafters eliminated the provision limiting the act's scope to commercial transac-
tions. 5 Understandably, there are other legitimate political considerations for
excluding wills, however, these reasons justify exclusion only if they outweigh the
danger of denying reliable evidence of testamentary intent."
2. Property
The requirement that conveyances of land and leases for more than one year be
in writing is another vestige of the original Statute of Frauds.47 Virtually all states'
141. See generally Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 25, at 314; Jueneman & Robertson, supra
note 37.
142. U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Laws Exclusions Report § V(B) (Sept. 21, 1998).
143. Stated another way, ceremony is a function and not a purpose.
144. It is ironic the Task Force based its decision to exclude in part on the fact that wills do not
significantly affect commerce, given that the January 1998 draft specifically removed language limiting
the scope of the act to commercial transactions. This change makes it apparent that the drafters believe
the act's coverage should extend beyond commercial transactions.
145. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
146. This comment does not purport to advocate the inclusion of wills in electronic writing and
signature legislation absent consideration of political issues. This comment merely argues that excluding
wills because will formalities cannot be served in an electronic format is not necessarily correct. Thus,
if incompatibility is the only reason for exclusion, wills such not be blindly excluded but instead, laws
should be drafted to avoid these incompatibilities.
147. Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677, provided:
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That from and after the said four
and twentieth day of June no action shall be brought whereby to charge any executor or
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statute of frauds provisions regarding real property transfers have seen little change
from the original Statute.'" Under these laws, a typical writing must contain the
parties' names, the price, a description of the property, and the signature of both
parties. 49 Given that the writing and signature requirement for conveyances of real
property is a Statute of Frauds provision, the previous discussion of the functions
served by writings and signatures is particularly applicable.
An important, if not the primary purpose of the writing and signature requirement
is again evidentiary. History supports the conclusion that the principal purpose for
requiring a written transfer of land is evidentiary. Before written contracts, a
conveyance was accomplished by enfeoffment: a public ceremony conducted on the
land. By handing over a part of the land, usually a twig or clod of dirt, the
ceremony was a symbolic transfer of seisen. '" After enfeoffment, the transferor
lost all interest in the property. And though these transfers took place without
writings, written documents ultimately replaced enfeoffment as a more efficient
method of memorializing a transfer.' The fact that existing statutes have seen no
significant change.,; since the seventeenth century tends to undermine a suggestion
that the writing and signature requirement serves any purpose other than an
evidentiary one."
Consistent application of the equitable doctrine of partial performance further
supports this view of the importance of the evidentiary function. This doctrine
permits the enforceability of oral agreements to convey land when one party has
partially performed a contract. Two potential justifications exist for the courts' use
of partial performance: (1) that the action taken by one of the parties substantially
satisfies the evidentiary requirement and (2) that the doctrine prevents irreparable
administrator upon any special promise, to answer out of his own estate; (2) or whereby
to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriages of another person; (3) or to charge any person upon agreement made upon
consideration of marriage; (4) or upon any contract Eflor sale of lands, tenements or
herediments, or any interest in or concerning them; (5) or upon any agreement that is not
to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof; (6) unless the
agreement upor. which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2. ch. 3, § 4 (Eng. 1677) (emphasis deleted).
148. See UNIF. LAND TRANSACTIONS Act § 2-201 cmt. (1997).
149. See JESSE DLKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 587 (3d ed. 1993).
150. See Ray A. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes, The American Recording System,
PROB. & PROP., May-June 1989, at 27, 27.
151. See id.
152. Again, this does not mean a writing or signature does not serve other functions. The Task
Force on State Law E~clusions stated that "the execution formalities for real estate transactions are
intended to promote deliberation and prevent fraud." U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions
Report § V(E) (Sept. 21, 1998). Even if this is true, these purposes are served by actually executing and
having a record, not by the form of the record. The Oklahoma Act would not alter a requirement calling
for the existence of a writing, therefore these purposes are still served. It is important to keep in mind
that electronic signatur: and writing legislation does not eliminate "writing" requirements, they only




injury.'53 In McIntosh v. Murphy, for example, the court justified its application
of partial performance by stating that "there is considerable discretion for a court
to implement the true policy behind the Statute of Frauds, which is to prevent fraud
or any other type of unconscionable injury."'
Preventing inequitable harm is undeniably a justification cited by courts, 55 yet
it cannot be the sole reason for application of the doctrine; there must still be
evidence of a transfer. If performance by the parties did not provide sufficient
evidence of the existence of an agreement, unquestionably it would be inequitable
to enforce an agreement that did not exist. Equity is served only when the parties'
actions provide evidence that the parties entered into an agreement. Thus, it appears
that the evidentiary function is the primary, if not the sole basis for requiring a
written transfer of real property."
Because the purpose of these statute of frauds provisions is primarily evidentiary,
the predominate consideration is whether an electronic record or signature provides
sufficient evidentiary support. It is apparent that many forms of electronic writings
and signatures satisfy the evidentiary purpose. For example, suppose a buyer sends
a message digest along with an encrypted and digitally signed message to a seller
reading: "I hereby offer you $100,000 for Lot A." Seller, upon receiving the
message verifies the validity of the buyer's digital certificate and using the same
secure methods, replies: "Your offer is accepted." This message certainly provides
more reliable evidence than traditional ink on paper letters containing the same
information."
The sole reported case addressing this issue concurs, suggesting that a mere e-
mail message is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds in the context of a real
estate transaction. In Hessenthaler v. Farzin, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
held that a mailgram confirming acceptance of a real estate sale constituted a signed
writing capable of satisfying the Statute of Frauds. The court added in a
footnote that these issues will arise with greater frequency as parties rely on
"electronic mail, telexes and facsimile machines."" In making this comment, the
court implied that electronic mail is a satisfactory means of creating an enforceable
land sale contract.'6' To be sure that the court gave sufficient weight to the
153. See DUMINIER & KRIER, supra note 149, at 588.
154. McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (1970).
155. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Carrington's Heirs, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 86 (1835); Garret v. Gerard, 156 F.2d
227 (10th Cir. 1946); Holt v. Alexander, 248 P.2d 228 (Okla. 1952); Weaver v. Weaver, 579 P.2d 216
(Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
156. The Task Force on State Law Exclusions concluded that a written document is no longer of
great importance in real estate transactions because it is possible to establish from outside sources
whether a transfer was made. These "outside indicia" include transfer of possession, occupation of the
property, traceable payments, and loan applications. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions
Report § V(E) (Sept. 21, 1998).
157. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 25, at 314; see also discussion supra note 2.
158. 564 A.2d 990 (1989).
159. See id. at 992.
160. Id. at 992 n.3.
161. Cf PEB Commentary No. 15, Electronic Filing Under Article 9 (Aug. 1996).
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evidentiary function, the court expressly noted that the "purpose of the [S]tatute [of
Frauds] is to prevent the possibility of enforcing unfounded, fraudulent claims by
requiring that contracts pertaining to interests in real estate to be supported by
written evidence signed by the party creating the interest.""
Accordingly, there is no logical reason, other than tradition alone, for concluding
that electronic formats are repugnant to the purposes for requiring a writing and
signature in a land sale contract." If the electronic method utilized is sufficiently
reliable, no adequate justification exists for denying it efficacy. As the Hessent-
haler court noted, the proper approach is to examine the reliability of a writing,
rather than insisting on a formal signature.' The Third Circuit aptly stated,
"[A]djudicators sh:uld always be satisfied with some note or memorandum that is
adequate ... to ccnvince the court that there is no serious possibility of consum-
mating fraud by enforcement."' '" Electronic writing and signature legislation
should reflect this statement and permit electronic methods whenever they are
"sufficiently definite to indicate with reasonable certainty that a contract to convey
has been made by the parties."' '
Of course, a transfer of real property is not complete without the delivery of a
validly executed deed, and deeds raise notable independent issues apart from the
land sale contract. Two important points of consideration are whether a deed itself
can be electronic and whether a deed can be electronically recorded.
Deed execution formalities are statutorily mandated, yet most states have similar
requirements and it is therefore easiest to proceed by examining the four traditional
parts of a deed: the premises, the habendum, the execution clause, and the
acknowledgement." The premises clause consists of the names of the grantor
and grantee, an explanation of the transaction, the consideration given, the
operative words of conveyance, and the legal description of the land." The
habendum, which is the "to have and hold" clause, contains the declaration of
trust.'" Taken alone, the habendum serves no necessary function in the modern
deed, however, the clause may also contain any needed covenants of title. 7" The
execution clause simply contains the signatures of the grantor and, if applicable,
the grantor's spouse, along with the signatures of any witnesses.'
These initial elements are not entirely dissimilar in content or in purpose from
the requisite parts of a land sale contract, nor are the execution formalities unlike
162. ld.
163. Of course, this argument applies equally to leases that are subject to the Statute of Frauds.
164. See id.
165. Flight Sys., Inc. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 112 F.3d 124, 128 (3d Cir. 1997).
166. UNIF. LAND TRANSACrIONS ACT § 2-201 cmt. (1997). Again, however, the ultimate decision
as to whether include laws relating to real property is influenced by political decisions, such as the need
to enact the legislation.




170. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 149, at 628 n.9.




will formalities.'" Thus, the previous discussions of wills and contracts for con-
veyance of land are particularly relevant in this context.'" Again, the principle
purposes of these requirements are arguably evidentiary and cautionary, although
the evidentiary function served by deeds is of greater effect given that deeds are
recorded. 74 Given the statutory nature of execution formalities, deeds are also
fairly uniform and therefore may also promote the channeling function.
A significant difference between a contract for sale and a deed arises, however,
in the acknowledgment requirement.' Acknowledgment of a deed simply means
notarization."6 Notarization typically conjures images of a physical act performed
by a notary public, an act which obviously cannot be performed electronically. Yet
focusing on the act would be misguided; the emphasis should be on the object of
notarization: authentication. The purpose of acknowledgment by a notary is to
further assure the authenticity of a deed and protect against forgery." The
172. Another similarity between the deed and the land sale contract is the historical absence of a
writing. As previously noted, writings evolved as an efficient method of evidencing transfers. Prior to
the passage of the Statute of Frauds "possession was the only evidence of title and ... proof of a transfer
of title existed solely in the memory of witnesses present at the time when the change of possession
occurred." I RUFFORD G. PATrON & CAROL G. PATrON, PATrON ON LAND TITLES § 3 (2d ed. 1957).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 102-66.
174. The most meaningful evidentiary function served by the deed stems from recording, yet to
a degree, some of the execution formalities may no longer be necessary to further this purpose. As the
Task Force noted, it is usually possible to determine the existence of a contract between the parties
from a "myriad of outside indicia." See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(E)
(Sept. 21, 1998).
Concerning the cautionary function, the Task Force Report stated that "execution formalities for real
estate transactions are intended to promote deliberation and prevent fraud." Id. § V(E)(l). Although
true, because a contract for sale has already been executed by the time a deed is drawn, the cautionary
impact of executing a deed is necessarily diminished.
175. Albeit most states, including Oklahoma, do not mandate an acknowledgment in order for a
deed to be valid between parties, deeds must generally be notarized prior to recording; thus, deeds are
almost universally acknowledged as a matter of practice. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 149, at
628 n.10.
176. Notarization is obviously required in numerous other instances as well, and it should therefore
be noted that the Oklahoma Act, as well as other electronic writing and signature laws, have a broad
impact on these requirements. Thus, the discussion here is applicable to other statutes calling for
notarization.
177. See CRIBBEr & JOHNSON, supra note 167, at 206; Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards,
Notaries Public - Lost in Cyberspace, or Key Business Professionals of the Future?, 15 JOHN
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 703, 705-06 (1997). Notarization also serves two less important
purposes: a ceremonial purpose and a bonding purpose. Regarding the ceremonial purpose, the formality
of having a signature attested by a notary may impress upon the signer the legal significance of his or
her actions. Furthermore, it may promote reflection by highlighting the importance of the document. See
U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(I)(l) (Sept. 21, 1998).
Electronic notarization, being a physically detached method of authentication, would not provide for
reflection nor create an impression of importance. In fact, the routine use of a certification authority in
every transaction may undermine the solemnity associated with notarization. It must therefore be
ascertained whether a notarization requirement serves the purpose of ceremony or merely the function
of ceremony. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. The Task Force recognized the ceremonial
benefit of notarization but nevertheless recommended that the ETA recognize some means of electronic
authentication. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(i) (Sept. 21, 1998).
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essential determination, therefore, is if and how authentication can be performed
electronically.
Not surprisingly, means exist for the electronic notarization of documents. The
most often cited method is the use of a "cyber-notary." The term cyber-notary is
misleading, however, because a cyber-notary is simply a certification authority. 7 '
As previously nentioned, a certification authority is a trusted third party who is
responsible for binding a party to a particular public key and thereby authenticating
a signature. Another method of electronic notarization is the use of biometric
methods, which provide reliable evidence of the signer's identity. Although the use
of a cyber-notay or biometrics is dramatically different from a traditional notary
in form, there is no difference in the fundamental service provided.' The Task
Force noted that "if properly utilized, [the use of certification authorities and
biometrics] provide the same type of heightened evidence of the signer's identity
as a traditional acknowledgment."'" Accordingly, an electronic deed can be
notarized.
Of course, to b. effective, a deed must also be delivered. Because, however,
delivery of a deed refers only to an intent to be bound and not a physical act, it
is immaterial whether the deed is electronic or paper. 8'
The more onercus question is whether a deed can be electronically recorded. 2
In examining this issue, the Task Force noted that Ontario currently uses a system
that allows the electronic filing of deeds in a public registry.'" Evidence of the
efficacy of an electronic recording system cannot rely on Ontario as a model,
though, because that system uses title registration, not recording.'U This is not
Notaries further senre a bonding function by subjecting the notary to liability for negligent, reckless,
or willful conduct. Tie notary does not act as a guarantor of identity but failure to comply with
reasonable standards of ascertaining a signer's identity triggers liability. The bonding function is
minimized, however, because most bonds are of a small dollar amount. In fact, no bond requirement in
the United States exceods $10,000. See Closen & Richards, supra, at 725-26.
178. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
179. See Closen & Richards, supra note 177, at 714.
180. U.E.T.A. T.,k Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(I) (Sept. 21, 1998).
181. In Berigan v. Berigan, the Supreme Court of Illinois clearly described the delivery requirement,
stating:
[Dielivery of a deed is strictly a matter of the intention of the grantor as manifested and
evidenced by tie words, acts and circumstances surrounding the transaction. Manual
transfer of the deed is not indispensable to delivery .... The controlling factor in
determining the question of delivery in all cases is the intention of the grantor.
Berigan v. Berigan, 108 N.E.2d 438, 444 (I1. 1952).
182. It is not actually essential for an electronic deed to be electronically recorded. It would be
possible for an electroric deed to be delivered to the county recorders office and then manually entered
into an index.
183. See U.E.T.A Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(E)(I) (Sept. 21, 1998).
184. See John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer Age,
18 WM. MrrcHE-LL L. REv. 61, 74 (1992). The Ontario system, called POLARIS, actually uses both
recording and title registration. Data storage and retrieval is completely electronic and data can be
retrieved using parcel identifiers, persons' names, tax assessment numbers or registered documents. See




to say that examples of electronic recording systems do not exist. In fact, title
insurance companies have used computerized land title record systems since the
1960s and some municipalities have used unofficial systems since the 1970s."8
In these systems, a transfer of ownership is recorded by adding the necessary
information to an electronic file. The file is analogous to a tract index."8
Systems exist which demonstrate that real estate records can be maintained
electronically. Moreover, given that recording is designed to protect a bona fide
purchaser for valuable consideration who purchases without notice of a prior
transaction, electronic recording is not repugnant to statutes requiring recording as
long as the electronically stored information is retrievable.'
The Task Force concluded that laws relating to real estate records should be
included in the ETA, leaving the states to decide the recording issue. The Task
Force reasoned that as presently drafted, the ETA allows governments to determine
methods of filing.8 ' Specifically, the ETA enables government agencies to
establish filing standards.' This approach is the correct one. It recognizes that
the creation and recording of real estate records is not repugnant to the laws
governing those instruments. More importantly, this approach is permissive; it
allows states to develop electronic systems for the recording or registration of real
estate transactions and it embraces the potential efficiencies that technology can
bring to an otherwise cumbersome process.
3. Various Other Statutory Writing and Signature Requirements
As the previous discussion illustrates, exclusions for wills and real property
conveyances are not always warranted. Additionally, the wills discussion shows
that under some circumstances, exclusion is. appropriate, but under other
circumstances there are satisfactory technological alternatives. Legislatures should
not heedlessly exclude entire statutes because a particular law, depending on the
circumstances, may or may not be satisfied by an electronic method. The current
state of the ETA does not provide for this contingency. The Oklahoma Act
185. See id. at 115. The question of whether to employ a recording system or a title registry is not
new but computerized databases add a twist to the debate. Technology offers efficiency advantages under
either system, however, it would be easier to implement a computerized recording system in the United
States. This is true because not only is recording used in a majority of jurisdictions, but it would also
avoid the time and expense associated with the judicial proceedings required with title registry. See id.
at 121-22.
Consideration must also be given to the political issues involved with computerization. Com-
puterization of land title records threatens abstract companies because electronic records would eliminate
the need for abstractors. Because no assurances are made in a recording system, however, there would
still be a need for title companies or an attorney's title opinion. Thus, it may be easier to pass legislation
enabling computerized recording rather than a computerized registry.
186. See id. at 117.
187. See Sweat, supra note 150, at 27.
188. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(E)(l) (Sept. 21, 1998).
189. See U.E.T.A. § 202(a) (Draft Mar. 19, 1999) (reading in part that a "governmental agency...
shall determine whether, and the extent to which, it will send and accept electronic records and electronic
signatures to and from other persons").
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provides some flexibility through its use of a repugnancy clause, but its
enumerated exclusions, as previously shown, are too broad.
Undoubtedly, legislators could endeavor to draft detailed laws examining
individual statutes, thereby providing for such eventualities, but in effect, such a
law would merely define repugnancy in reference to specific statutes. It is
manifestly unreasonable, however, to believe legislatures could specify the
acceptable electronic methods for each statute calling for a writing or signature,
Moreover, even if it were possible to scour every law, the rapid growth of
technology would render such an effort ineffectual. It is for this reason that a
repugnancy clause is necessary. The remainder of this section attempts to give
guidance on how a repugnancy clause would be applied to various statutes. This
section proceeds by examining three distinctly different statutes: a statute which,
through its text alone, demonstrates an inconsistency with electronic writing and
signature statutes; a conventional statute which requires an examination of both the
text of the statute and its intent; and a statute which implicitly requires a writing
or signature.
a) Statutory Text Creating an Inconsistency
An interesting starting point is an intriguing law contained in the Oklahoma
Statutes pertaining to letters given to employees upon discharge or resignation
from a public service corporation."' The statute provides that, upon request, an
employer shall designate in writing the nature of the services rendered by the
employee and the reason for the discharge or resignation. It further provides:
[S]uch a letter shall be written, in its entirety, upon a plain white sheet
of paper to be selected by such employee. No printed blank shall be
used, and if such letter shall be written upon a typewriter, it shall be
signed with pen and black ink and immediately beneath such signature
shall be affixed the official stamp, or seal, of said superintendent...
in an upright position. There shall be no figures, words or letters used,
upon such piece of paper, except such as are plainly essential ... and
no such letter shall have any picture, imprint, character, design, device,
impression oj" mark, either in the body thereof or upon the face or back
thereof .... "
This provision, enacted in 1907, was designed to prevent "blacklisting" among
employers and has little relevance today."9 Nevertheless, the express language
190. See 40 OKLA. STAT. § 171 (1991).
191. Id.
192. In Dickson v. Perry, the court explained the practice of blackmailing, stating that:
[Alt one time it was the rule among railway companies and other corporations to keep a
list of employe[e]s who were discharged or left the service and to furnish such list to
other railway companies and employers. Any reason which might be agreed upon among
employers was sfficient for "blacklisting" employe[e]s, thereby, possibly preventing their
again securing employment in their accustomed occupation or trade. It was this abuse




of the statute provides a prime example of a manifest inconsistency with an
electronic format. Revisiting the language of the Oklahoma Act's repugnancy
clause, a law is excluded when an electronic format is "inconsistent with the intent
as expressed by the rule of law."'" It is difficult to imagine a law that, on its
face, is more antithetical to an electronic medium. Not only does this provision
mandate paper and ink, it specifies the type of paper and the color of the ink. This
law demonstrates that occasionally, statutory text alone expresses a manifest
inconsistency and accordingly, there is no need to look at the purposes of writings
or signatures to determine repugnancy. However, this statutory remnant is an
aberration. It is understood that few statutes are as free from ambiguity.
b) Examination of Text and Intent to Determine Repugnancy
Because few statutes will demonstrate an inconsistency through text alone, it
will often be necessary to examine the purposes behind a statute's writing and
signature requirement. Wills and conveyances of real property are an example.
Another example are business association statutes such as partnership or
corporation laws. A few states that have enacted electronic writing and signature
legislation in a limited context have extended their use to all signature and writing
requirements contained in their business association laws."' While this may
imply that such provisions in the Oklahoma laws should be covered, and may to
a limited extent provide persuasive authority for this proposition, these statutes are
nevertheless worthy of examination.
The Oklahoma General Corporation Act, patterned after the Delaware General
Corporation Law, is littered with references to writings and signatures. The bulk
of these provisions govern documentation of actions taken by boards of directors
or officers, and an examination of a few of these provisions therefore has
widespread implications for the entire General Corporation Act.
The initial step in determining repugnancy is ascertaining the purposes of the
writing or signature requirement. Title 18, section 1007 of the Oklahoma Statutes
governs instruments that must be executed, acknowledged, filed, and recorded with
the Secretary of State, one in particular being the Certificate of Incorporation."'
The statute provides that original copies of instruments filed must contain the
signature or signatures of certain designated persons such as the secretary,
president, or members of the board. The text of the law states that a signature is
an "acknowledgment of the signatory ... that the instrument is his act and deed
unlawful and requiring corporations to give a letter to employe[e]s discharged or leaving
their service.
Dickson v. Perry, 181 P. 504, 510 (Okla. 1919).
193. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 963 (Supp. 1998).
194. Idaho specifically limits the application of its statute to provisions contained in the Idaho
Business Corporation Act while Arizona, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wyoming
have legislation applying to all documents filed with the Secretary of State. See supra notes 58, 61
(citing the legislation of the various states).
195. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1007 (1991).
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or the act and deed of the corporation."'" As determined from the statute's
language, the signature serves an evidentiary purpose of attesting to the official
nature of an act.
Section 1007, lEowever, only concerns methods for filing and executing any
instrument filed with the Secretary of State, leaving to other sections of the
General Corporation Act governance of the substance of these documents. For
instance, section 1006 provides that the Certificate of Incorporation must contain:
(1) the name of the corporation; (2) the address of the registered office; (3) the
nature and purpose of the business; (4) language relating to the classes of shares
to be issued; (5) the name and mailing address of the incorporator; and (6) the
names of the members of the board if the incorporator's powers terminate upon
filing.97 These prescriptions create a degree of uniformity among all Certificates
of Incorporation znd thereby also promote the channeling function. However,
because these documents are normally drafted by counsel or taken from form
books, the statutory provisions do not often promote the cautionary or clarifying
functions.
Taken together, the writing and signature requirements of sections 1006 and
1007 of the General Corporation Act promote an evidentiary function (of attesting
to the official nature of an act) and a channeling function. The next step is
determining whether, in the context of corporations laws, an electronically
authenticated document adequately serves the evidentiary and channeling functions.
Initially, it should be noted that section 1007 of the Oklahoma General Corporation
Act states that any instrument filed with the Secretary of State may contain a
facsimile signature. Furthermore, the Delaware General Corporation Law provides
that a signature may be a facsimile or "an electronically transmitted signature. ""
Against this background, it is apparent that an electronic signature is satisfactory
because it provides the necessary indication that the execution of the document and
any act referred to therein were authorized by the proper persons and comply with
the statutory proscriptions. Express allowances for facsimile signatures indicate the
legislature's intent to adopt efficient methods that comport with current business
practices. Permitting facsimile signatures further illustrates that the documents
contemplated by the Act are not instruments that are normally subject to fraud, and
therefore do not call for heightened security measures. For these reasons, an
electronic signature is not inconsistent with the purpose behind the section 1007
signature requirement. Additionally, because the Oklahoma Act does not alter any
provisions concerning the content of the instrument, the channeling benefit created
by the statute is unaffected by an electronic writing.
As previously noted, many of the documents mandated by the General
Corporation Act must be retained in an original form. The corporation (or
corporate counsel) normally retains these documents in the company's books and
records." Although electronic document retention is not the focus of this
196. Id.
197. See id. § 1006.
198. Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. Laws § 103(h) (1974).




comment, a practical question that arises is whether corporate books and records
can be retained in an electronic form. The answer seems to be yes. Section 11 of
the Oklahoma Act specifically provides that records may be stored in an electronic
format.' Existing paper documents can be converted to an electronic medium
as well. Moreover, the Oklahoma Act provides that an electronic record satisfies
a rule of law calling for an original."
c) Implied Writings and Signatures
The previously examined statutes all explicitly call for a writing or signature, but
this is not always the case. Often, a statute discusses an instrument that is known
to be a paper document, yet the text of the law does not specifically so provide.
The Oklahoma Act states that it applies when a rule of law "requires a record to
be in writing."' The question necessarily becomes whether the Oklahoma Act
covers implied writings. In furtherance of the Oklahoma Act's professed purposes,
this comment concludes that implied writings should be covered by its provisions,
but again, only if the purposes behind those requirements are satisfied by an
electronic medium.'
An example of a statute containing an implied paper document is title 12,
section 2004 of the Oklahoma Statutes - the Oklahoma provision governing
process. This section references a complaint, yet it does not expressly mandate a
paper document. The methodology for analyzing implied writings should never-
theless remain the same.
Section 2004 provides for three methods of service of process: personal service,
service by mail, and publication service. The purpose of the statutory prescriptions
is to provide a defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. As the Supreme
Court espoused in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., "[t]he funda-
mental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. This right
to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or
contest."'
Personal service is unmistakably designed to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of notice. Personal service provides a witness who can attest that
notice was given. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has stated that personal service
is not a constitutional guarantee.' Service by mail, while not providing the
degree of reliability as to evidence of receipt afforded by personal service, is a
permissible alternative means of apprising interested parties. The Oklahoma
action forms.
200. This provision reads that "[i]f a rule of law requires that certain documents, records, or
information be retained, that requirement is met by retaining electronic records if the information
contained in the electronic record remains accessible." 15 OKLA. STAT. § 968 (Supp. 1998).
201. See itL § 967.
202. Id. § 964.
203. See id. § 961 (stating the Act's purposes).
204. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted).
205. See id. at 315.
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Pleading Code resolves the issue of reliability by providing that service by mail
cannot be a basis for the entry of a default judgment unless there is proof of
service either by a return receipt or refusal of process by the defendant.'
The last prescribed method is service by publication. Unlike personal service or
service by mail, publication cannot reasonably be argued to provide notice.
Instead, publication is designed to permit a plaintiff to proceed whenever a
defendant is missing. The ineffectual nature of publication is readily recognized
by the courts. As the Supreme Court asserted in Mullane:
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as prescribed here,
is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties .... Chance alone
brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in
small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes
his home outside of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds the
information will never reach him are large indeed.'
The standard established in Mullane has significant implications concerning the
viability of electronic methods. Initially, it is undeniable that any electronic
method is manifestly inconsistent with the idea of personal service because of
metaphysical impossibility. The same cannot be said about service by mail and
publication. The reason behind allowing service by mail is cost efficiency.' °
Furthermore, by providing that service by mail cannot be a basis for the entry of
a default judgment absent proof of receipt, service by mail does not abrogate a
defendant's constitutional right to notice. If the same conditions are attached, no
apparent reason exists for denying service by an electronic method.' Moreover,
electronic service would further efficiency.
Subject to the procedural safeguards concerning the entry of a default judgment,
electronic service appears as constitutional as service by mail. Electronic
publication, on the other hand, could actually offer a greater likelihood of
providing notice than the traditional method of service by publication. Currently,
one problem with publication service is that it is necessarily limited by a
newspaper's circulation area. Any defendant outside of that area is virtually
206. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2004(C)(2)(c) (1991).
207. Id.
208. Service by mil, as provided in the Oklahoma Statutes, is similar to waiver of service as
prescribed in Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Advisory Committee Notes for the
1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules state:
The general purpose of this revision is to facilitate the service of the summons and
complaint ....
mhe revised rule clarifies and enhances the cost-saving practice of securing the assent
of the defendant to dispense with actual service of the summons and complaint. This
practice was introduced to the rule in 1983 by an act of Congress authorizing "service-by-
mail," a procedure that affects economic service with cooperation of the defendant.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
209. See infra note 314 and accompanying text (discussing the reliability of e-mail versus delivery
by the United States Postal Service). Although e-mail is less reliable, if a default judgement cannot be




assured of not being notified. Modern technology could solve this geographic
limitation. As the name World Wide Web indicates, a posting on the Internet
spans the globe. It is easy to imagine a web directory established for the posting
of legal notices. Additionally, small type buried in the back of a classified section
would be less of a worry. A web directory could contain a search engine whereby
a defendant could search by name or any other-key word.
Is this hypothetical web directory a viable option? The test espoused by the
Supreme Court is that when a defendant cannot be located, the method chosen to
provide notice is constitutionally permissible if "it is not substantially less likely
to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes."2t
Electronic publication satisfies this test because it offers a potentially greater
likelihood to affect notice than traditional methods of publication. Such a system
does not presently exist but that is precisely the point; such a system could exist
if electronic writing and signature legislation is appropriately crafted.
D. When Does an Inconsistency Arise Under the UCC or Consumer Protection
Laws?
The UCC and consumer protection laws are discussed independent of other
statutes because they are treated differently by the Oklahoma Act. Neither is
expressly excluded from the Oklahoma Act, yet its language can reasonably be
construed as demanding this result. Section six of the Oklahoma Act provides that
all transactions under the Act are subject to the UCC and rules of law relating to
consumer protection."' The Oklahoma Act further specifies that whenever a
conflict of law arises between the Act and either the UCC or a consumer
protection law, the latter rules govern."' This provision is essential because it
prevents the Oklahoma Act from altering substantive provisions contained in the
Code or in consumer protection provisions. Difficulty arises, however, from the
language stating that in the case of a conflict between the Oklahoma Act and these
rules, the Oklahoma Act is subordinate. Thus, whenever the Code or consumer
laws call for a writing or signature, unless writings and signatures are defined in
a media neutral context, an inconsistency arises that the Oklahoma Act would not
affect21 This result could seriously limit the scope and effect of the Oklahoma
Act2 4 It is therefore essential to determine when such inconsistencies arise and
how they should be treated.
210. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added).
211. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 963(C)(2) (Supp, 1998).
212. See id. § 963().
213. Cf. PEB Commentary No. 15, Electronic Filing Under Article 9 (Aug. 1996).
214. This result will depend on whether, and to what extent Title 12A of the Oklahoma Statutes
mirrors the official text of the UCC. This is because the UCC has endeavored to make most sections
media neutral. To the extent a statute already provides for media neutrality, exclusion is moot. See infra
notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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1. UCC2 15
The Task Force on State Law Exclusions concluded that the ETA should apply
to all UCC provisions that do not currently recognize electronic methods.2 6 In
order to achieve this result, the September 1998 Draft eliminated language that is
similar to language contained in the Oklahoma Act. Ultimately, the ETA applies
only to articles 2 and 2A; the final draft excludes articles 3, 4A, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.
These articles are excluded, however, because the sections in these articles have
already endeavored to accommodate electronic formats. 7 Because, however, the
Oklahoma Act does not reflect this position, it is still necessary to determine if and
when the Code is inconsistent with the Oklahoma Act.
a) Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds has been criticized for centuries, and recently the much
maligned Statute has come under further attack!" A principal reason for renewed
criticism is uncertainty over whether electronic records and electronic signatures
satisfy the Statute of Frauds." 9 While courts have historically accommodated
technological advancements in interpreting the Statute,' much incertitude
continues to exist among the courts over the enforceability of contracts formed
using an electronic medium."
215. This discussion is not meant to fully cover draft revised article 2 or draft article 2B. For a
thorough discussion, see Walter A. Effross, 77Te Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web
Sites and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGo L. Rev. 1263 (1997).
216. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(E) (Sept. 21, 1998).
217. See U.E.T.A. § 103 (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999); see also U.E.T.A. § 103 cmt. 2 (Draft Mar.
19, 1999) (excluding articles 5, 7, & 8 "because they already provide significant media neutrality"). The
March 1999 Draft noted that when enacted, revised articles 2, 2A, & 9 would also be excluded, see
U.E.T.A. § 103 cmt.2 (Draft Mar. 19, 1999), but the final draft subjects articles 2 and 2A to the ETA,
see U.E.T.A. § 103(b)(2) (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999).
Indeed, many sections, of the UCC are now technology neutral. For example, section 5-104 provides
that a letter of credit irust be an authenticated record, rather than a signed writing. See alto PEB
Commentary No. 15, Electronic Filing Under Article 9 (Aug. 1996) (discussing whether a financing
statement can be electronic).
218. The statute has received negative treatment for hundreds of years. In Simon v. Metiver, 96 Eng.
Rep. 347, 348 (K.B. 1766), Lord Wilmot wrote, 'Had the Statute of Frauds been always carried into
execution according to the letter, it would have done ten times more mischief than it has done good, by
protecting, rather than preventing fraud.' Id. at 348; see also Francis Ireton, Should We Abolish the
Statute of Frauds?, 72 U.S. L. Rev. 195 (1938).
219. See supra note 80.
220. Case law has typically adopted changes in technology. See, e.g., Ellis Canning Co. v.
Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972) (arguing a tape recording of an oral agreement
satisfied the Statute of Frauds); Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 128 (S.D. Cal.
1948) (stating a court must "take a realistic view of modem business practices" in concluding that a
contract may be formed using a teletype machine); Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 & Co., 25
B.C.L.R.2d 377 (1988) (holding a faxed proxy was valid); Durkee v. Vermont Cent. R.R. Co., 29 Vt.
48 (1856) (concluding a telegraph should be treated the same as a normal writing).
221. In re Kaspar, 125 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 1997), is a prime example of judicial reluctance to




Fortunately, UCC draft revised article 2, draft revised article 2A, and draft article
2B solve these issues.' Draft revised article 2 and draft revised article 2A no
longer call for signed writings, but rather require records authenticated by the party
against whom enforcement is sought.m The term "record" replaces "writing" and
"authentication" replaces the traditional signature requirement. A record, as defined
by draft revised article 2, "means information that is inscribed on a tangible
medium, or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable ifi
perceivable form."' "Authentication" is defined as signing, executing or adopting
a symbol or sound, or encrypting a record with the intent to (1) identify the party;
(2) accept or adopt a record; or (3) establish the identity of a record."'
Draft article 213 further supports electronic formats. Section 213-113 states that
"a record or authentication may not be denied legal effect solely on the ground that
it is in electronic form."' These changes, when effective, mean that electronic
records and signatures satisfy the Statute of Frauds requirements. Accordingly, no
consequential inconsistency will exist between the Oklahoma Act (or the ETA) and
the UCC statute of frauds provisions.'
electronic communications was unenforceable. See id. at 1362. The court concluded that an electronic
record did not satisfy a federal bankruptcy code provision calling for a "statement in writing." The court
did, however, add:
We note with some wryness that in this instance the law lags behind technology and
custom, but that gap is a subject which must be addressed to the Congress and not the
courts. We will not undertake to write the express language of a statute merely to
accommodate the commercial conveniences attributable to modem technology.
Id.
222. These articles, however, are not the only code provisions containing statute of frauds
provisions. For example, section 9-203 provides that the debtor must sign a security agreement.
223. See U.C.C. Revised Article 2, § 2-201 (Draft May 1, 1998); U.C.C. Article 2A, § 2A-201
(Draft July 25-Aug. 1, 1997).
224. U.C.C. Revised Article 2, § 2-102(a) (Draft May 1. 1998).
225. See id. Draft Article 2A defines "authenticate" as:
sign[ing] or execut[ing] or adopt[ing] a symbol, or enctrypt[ing] a record in whole or in
part, with the present intent to identify the authenticating party or to adopt, or accept a
record or term, or to establish the authenticity of a record or term that contains the
authentication or to which a record containing the authentication refers.
U.C.C. Article 2A, § 2A-102(1) (Draft July 25-Aug. 1, 1997).
226. See U.C.C. Article 213 rptr. note (Draft Aug. 1, 1998) (positing "the mere fact that a message
or record is electronic does not alter or reduce its legal impact."). The note further states that the
principle is limited to the scope of article 2B and does not cover instruments, documents of title, or
similar applications of electronic commerce. Id. But see U.C.C. Article 213 Introduction (Draft Aug. 1,
1998) (stating "[iut is anticipated that the electronic commerce rules here will be adapted to article 2 and
article 2A or placed in article I ultimately applicable throughout the UCC.").
227. The March 1999 draft appeared concur with this conclusion by listing revised articles 2 and
2A as excluded articles, once adopted. Nonetheless, the final draft does not exclude articles 2 or 2A from
the ETA. See U.E.T.A. § 103(b)(2) (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999). See supra notes 216-17 and
accompanying text. Any inconsistency is also minimized because draft revised article 2 and draft article
2B significantly raise the floor dollar amount for contracts subject to the Statute from $500 to $5000.
See U.C.C. Revised Article 2, § 2-201(A) (Draft May 1, 1998); U.C.C. Article 213, § 2B-201(a) (Draft
Aug. 1, 1998).
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b) Warranties
Warranties for consumer goods under the UCC also create a potential incom-
patibility because currently, exclusions of or modifications to these warranties must
be written and conspicuous tm Section 2-316 of the UCC provides that "to exclude
or modify the implied warranty of merchantability ... the language must mention
merchantability and in the case of a writing be conspicuous.., and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be in writing and
conspicuous."'
Draft revised article 2, draft article 2A, and draft article 2B maintain the intent
behind these and other disclaimer provisions.' Indeed, draft article 2B states that
many of its provisions are meant to bolster existing consumer protection
provisions.' Yet, all of these articles recognize the need and ability for warranty
exclusions to be media neutral. These articles therefore address how a written
disclaimer is to be, made considering use of electronic means.
Draft revised article 2 defines conspicuous in the following manner:
(7)(A) Conspicuous, with reference to a term or clause, means so
written, displayed or presented that a reasonable person against whom
it is to operzte ought to have noticed it or, in the case of an electronic
message intended to invoke a response ....
([i]) A heading is conspicuous if it is in all capitals (as:
NEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) equal to or greater in size than the
surrounding text;
(ii) A term or a clause in the body of a record is conspicuous if it is
in larger or other contrasting type or color than other language;
(iii) Any term or clause in a telegram or other similar communication
is conspicuous ....
(c) In an electronic record or display a term or clause is conspicuous
if it is so positioned that a party cannot proceed without taking some
additional action with respect to the term or any prominent reference
thereto. 2
Draft article 2B contains a similar definition. 3
The language of these drafts directly solves one of the more difficult issues
surrounding the viability of electronic methods under the UCC. By defining
conspicuous in a media neutral context, the drafters of these articles eliminated any
228. Cf. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2306 (1994) (stating written consumer
product warranties must be clearly and conspicuously disclosed); see aLso 16 C.F.R. § 702.3 (1998).
229. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1990).
230. The intent behind these warranty disclaimer provisions is to provide customers with notice.
231. See U.C.C. Article 2B introduction (Draft Aug. 1, 1998).
232. U.C.C. Revised Article 2, § 2-102(7) (Daft May 1, 1998).
233. See Draft Article 2B, § 2B-46 (Draft Aug. 1, 1998); see also Draft Article 2A, § 2A-506 (Draft




perceived inconsistency between written warranty disclaimers and electronic
writings.
c) Negotiable Instruments
The law governing negotiable instruments grew out of commercial necessity.
Problems in transporting and securing gold and coins prompted merchants as early
as the thirteenth century to begin using commercial paper2m The King's courts,
however, did not recognize the validity of commercial paper, thereby forcing
merchants to develop their own courts.' The decisions from these courts were
known as Lex Mercatoria, or the Law Merchant. These principles eventually
became a part of the common law and were codified in the Bills of Exchange Act
of 1882' and further embraced by the Negotiable Instruments Law of 1896.'
Very little has changed in negotiable instruments law since that time,"9 yet the
laws promulgated in the nineteenth century do not reflect the practices of today's
electronic world. As one commentator has noted: "[w]e have evolved from a paper-
based world in which clipper ships roamed the seas to one in which information is
organized and structured into electronic messages." 9 Negotiable instruments law,
however, has not evolved correspondingly.
(1) Attributes of Negotiable Instruments
A negotiable instrument must be a written;2 unconditional promise to pay; 4
a fixed amount;, 4 in money; 3 payable on demand or at a definite time;'
payable to order or to bearer;" and signed by the maker or drawer.' The
requirement that a negotiable instrument be in writing provides for singularity and
permanence, but more importantly, it enables "merger."'24 The principle of merger
states that all the rights stemming from a negotiable instrument are embodied in a
physical document' Economic necessity compelled this "paperization" of rights
because a written instrument, which represented abstract rights, enabled the transfer
of those underlying rights by a transfer of a physical document.49 The physical
234. See KENNETH W. CLARKSON ET AL., WEsT's BUSINEss LAW 486 (6th ed. 1994).
235. See JAMES STEvEN ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 12
(1995).
236. See CLARKSON, supra note 234. at 486.
237. See David Friseh & Henry D. Gabriel, Much Ado About Nothing: Achieving Essential
Negotiability in an Electronic Environment, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 747, 748-49 (1995).
238. See id.
239. Id. at 49.
240. See U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(6), (9), 3-104(a) (1990).
241. See id. §§ 3-103(a)(6), 3.103(a)(9), 3-104(a), 3-106.
242. See id. §§ 3-104(a)(3), 3-112(b).
243. See id. §§ 3-104(a)(3), 3-107.
244. See id. §§ 3-104(a)(2), 3-108(a), (b).
245. See id. §§ 3-104(a)(1), 3-109; 3-110(a).
246. See id. §§ 3-103(a)(6), (9), 3-304(a).
247. See CLARKSON, supra note 234, at 492.
248. See Frisch & Gabriel, supra note 237, at 750.
249. See Robert Charles Clark, Abstract Rights Versus Paper Rights Under Article 9 of the Uniform
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manifestation is thfrefore of great import in negotiable instruments law. Transfers
can be accomplished only by making physical delivery of the document, discharge
of the debt can be made only to the holder of the paper, and creditors' only method
of asserting their claims is by obtaining the instrument.'
A key feature of a negotiable instrument, therefore, is its physical manifestation
and related possession. " On its face, this seems to be antagonistic with the notion
of an electronic record. For a holder, however, it is only the rights represented by
the document and not the document itself that is important." Negotiability is
based on the assumption that the only way to transfer the rights embodied by an
instrument is by physical delivery of a piece of paper. 3 Yet such a mindset is
outdated and unduly burdensome.' "[D]esigned for transactions in a horse-and-
buggy economy, negotiability's focus on physical documents imposes a significant
burden on transactions in the current age of electronic information processing.""
These burdens have effected changes in modem business practices, changes which
demonstrate that the transfer and possession of negotiable instruments can be
accomplished electronically - without paper.
Today's commercial practices reflect the fact that we live in an electronic world.
The growth of the importance of the wire transfer system, electronic funds
transfer (EFT) systems such as automated teller machines (ATM) and check-cards,
the mass securitization of secondary mortgage loans, and stored value cards are but
a few examples of this transformation. Commercial practices are increasingly reliant
on electronic methods and the law must recognize and support these changes. Legal
recognition of electronic negotiable instruments is of necessity. For example, as one
report notes, without such recognition, electronic banking will prematurely level
off.' Unfortunately, much sentiment has been expressed that electronic commerce
legislation should not cover negotiable instruments.' Yet, an examination of
Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 476-77 (1975).
250. See Frisch & Gabriel, supra note 237, at 757.
251. See infra not-s 295-300 and accompanying text, discussing ETA section 115's electronic
equivalence of possession.
252. See James A. Newell & Michael R. Gordon, Electronic Commerce and Negotiable Instruments
(Electronic Promissory Notes), 31 IDAHO L. REv. 819, 830-31 (1995); see also James Steven Rogers.
Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 197, 206 (1987).
253. See Rogers, supra note 252, at 480.
254. See id. at 209; see also Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit
Systems, 44 UCLA L. REv. 951, 987 (1997).
255. Id. at 954.
256. See Federal Reserve System Notices, 60 Fed. Reg. I11, 112 (1995) (stating the average daily
volume of Fedwire payments was 277,000 in 1993 with a value of $824 billion).
257. See Brian W. Smith & Timothy E. Keehan, 114 BANKING LJ. 506, 506-07 (June 1997); see
also Letter from Willian H. Towle to Jeffrey B. Ritter, Director Document Authentication Systems, Inc.
(Apr. 1, 1999) (accessitle at <http.//www.webcom.com/legaledlETAForuni/docs/ 040199wt.html>) (on
file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
258. See supra note 62 (discussing various state laws excluding negotiable instruments); see also
Letter from Stephanie H. Heller, Joseph H. Sommer, and Sophia R. Vicksman, Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, to Drafting Committee of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 2 (Feb. I, 1999)




modem business practices reveals that attempts to exclude the laws governing
negotiable instruments are not warranted.V9
(2) Checks
Banks have taken an active role in the push for electronic commerce legislation
and the banking industry has already implemented electronic methods for processing
checks.' Electronic presentment of checks is growing at a rapid rate."' The
reason for this transformation is simple - cost savings. It is estimated that banks
save eighty cents for every transaction that eliminates a paper check 2 Coupled
with the fact that Americans wrote over sixty three billion checks in 1997 alone, the
figures become staggering.' These costs, when paper is required, are due to
enormous labor requirements. Under the paper based system, depositor banks must
sort thousands of checks and then physically transport those checks to the payor
bank.' "In the modem checking system, negotiability is not an aid to the
effectiveness of the system, but an obstacle for the industry to overcome."'
Banks have also recognized that electronic methods present opportunities to
decrease losses resulting from fraud. According to the American Bankers
Association, there were over 1.3 million cases of check fraud in 1993, with losses
increasing from $568 million in 1991 to $815 million in 1993.' One of the
reasons cited is the short holding periods mandated by the Expedited Funds
Availability Act."
A hold period refers to the maximum time a depository bank may restrict
customer access to funds. Fraudulent check writers capitalize on this short holding
period because often a bank is required to release funds before it can verify whether
a check is valid.' Electronic presentment can help alleviate this problem by
speeding up the transfer of information between the depository bank and the payor
bank. Additionally, the Financial Services Technology Consortium (FSTC)' has
(on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
259. The Task Force on State Law Exclusions noted that current business practices present a
compelling argument for establishing a method for recognizing electronic negotiable instruments. See
U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(A) (Sept. 21, 1998).
260. See Scott Barancik, Banks Plug for Law to Establish Standard for Digital Signatures, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 12, 1998, at 3.
261. See ECP: Gateway to Truncation, CORPORATE EFT REPORT, May 31, 1995, at 5 (stating
electronic presentment doubled to about 650 million checks in 1994).
262. See Iowa Town Harvests Benefits of Electronic Payments, FED. RESERVE BANK CHIC. 1997
ANN. REP. [hereinafter 1997 ANN. REP.].
263. See id.
264. See Mann, supra note 254, at 986.
265. Id.
266. See Thomas C. Baxter & Richard E. Charlton, The Emerged and Emerging New Unifonn
Commercial Code: Litigation Under Articles 3, 4 and 4A During 1997, SC36 ALI-ABA COURSE
MATERIALS J., Dec. 11, 1997, at 77, 112.
267. See Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994).
268. See Baxter & Charlton, supra note 266, at 113.
269. The FSTC members are banks, technology developers and universities.
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concluded that authentication and verification technologies decrease opportunities
for fraud in the areas of signature verification and check tampering."'
Electronic presentment also eliminates the cumbersome and unnecessary process
of physical presentment. The process is straightforward. A depositor bank creates
an electronic record of a check and transmits that information to either the Federal
Reserve or the payor bankY' The electronic record can be a digital copy of the
check or can merely contain all the pertinent information from the check such as the
payor bank, account number, amount, date, and payee.'m This information is
sufficient to enable the payor bank to decide whether to honor or reject the check
and the payor bank then notifies the depositor bank whether it will honor the check.
The checks are then truncated (stored with the depository bank) instead of routed
to the payor bank. The depositor bank retains a digital image of the check and the
customer's statement contains either a copy of the check or a detailed description
of every check processed.
The UCC permits truncation and electronic presentment, and therefore no
inconsistency exists between the Oklahoma Act and the UCC in relation to this
aspect of the check clearing process.'m Section 3-501 provides that subject to
article 4, presentment may be made by any commercially reasonable means,
including electronic communication.' Additionally, section 4-110 expressly
authorizes private parties to enter into private agreements for electronic presentment
and section 4-209 covers electronic presentment warranties?"
270. See Check Intage Exchange Project (visited Sept. 26, 1998) <http'J/www.fstc.org/projects/
imaging/index.htmI>.
271. See idU If the information is sent through the Federal Reserve system, the electronic record is
referred to as an Electronic Cash Letter (ECL). Electronic presentment occurs when the Federal Reserve
transmits this record to the payor bank. See 1997 ANN. REP., supra note 262.
272. This information is known as the MICR line.
273. See Baxter 45t Charlton, supra note 266, at 117; see also 12 C.F.R. § 229.36(c) (1999)
(regulation CC) (authorizing truncation agreements but curtailing the parties' ability to vary Regulation
CC requirements governing check collection).
274. See U.C.C. § 3-501(b)(1) (1990). The section reads:
Presentment may be made at the place of payment of the instrument and must be made
at the place of rayment if the instrument is payable at a bank in the United States; may
be made by any commercially reasonable means, including aft oral, written, or electronic
communication; is effective when the demand for payment or acceptance is received by
the person to whom presentment is made; and is effective if made to any one of two or
more makers, acceptors, drawers, or other payors.
Id.
275. The official comment to section 4-110 provides in part:
"An agreement for electronic presentment" refers to an agreement under which
presentment may be made to a payor bank by a presentment notice rather than by
presentment of the item. Under imaging technology now under development, the
presentment notee might be an image of the item. The electronic presentment agreement
may provide thrt the item may be retained by a depositary bank, other collecting bank,
or even a customer of the depositary bank, or it may provide that the item will follow the
presentment notce. The identifying characteristic of an electronic presentment agreement
is that presentment occurs when the presentment notice is received.




Considering that checks can be processed electronically, the logical next step is
to create them electronically. Proposals for electronic check creation are already
underway. Presently, different pilot programs are in place, two of which should be
noted. One program, implemented by the FSTC, is a method for making payments
over the Internet, while the second program, designed by the Electronic Checking
Council (ECC), enables the creation of electronic checks in face-to-face transactions
with retailers.27
Under the FSTC program, an electronic check appears on a buyer's computer
screen and is digitally signed by the drawer using the same methods as signing a
digital message.'m The drawer then transmits the check to the payee, who digitally
endorses the check and forwards it to a depositor bank.' Once received by the
depositor bank, processing is essentially the same as electronic presentment.
The ECC program addresses situations in which transactions do not take place
over the Internet but in face-to-face transactions. A purchaser still writes a paper
check, but instead of releasing it to the retailer, the purchaser voids the check.'
The purchaser signs an authorization form enabling the retailer to convert the voided
check into an electronic check and the check is then scanned, creating a digital
copy. The digital copy is subsequently forwarded to the depositor bank to be
electronically processed.'
Difficulty arises, however, because it is presently unclear whether electronic
checks are governed by the UCC. Articles 3 and 4 refer to written instruments or
items. Section 3-103(a) defines the term "order" as a "written instruction to pay
money signed by the person giving the instruction" and the word "promise" as a
"written undertaking to pay money signed by the person undertaking to pay."
Because the Oklahoma Act is subordinate to the UCC, it provides no guidance on
this issue. Nevertheless, the FSTC concluded that since section 4-103(a) of the UCC
allows parties to vary its terms by agreement, banks and bank customers can
proceed with electronic checking systems despite this uncertainty. Application
of the UCC by agreement simply circumvents the issue, though. Given the
substantial cost savings involved, it nevertheless seems apparent that banks and
other businesses will increasingly use electronic checks. For this reason, legislatures
should develop a legal framework for the recognition of electronic checks.
276. More information about the ECC and the Electronic Check pilot program can be found at
<http'//www.nacha.org/ecc>.
277. See Catherine Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Electronic
Money and Beyond, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 671, 686-87 (1997).
278. See id.
279. See Customer Q & A on Electronic Check at the Point of Sale (visited Sept. 26, 1998)
<http'//www.nacha.orgtecc/Check%2Oit%200ut.doc> (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
280. See id.
281. See Memorandum from Robert G. Ballen and Thomas A. Fox to Financial Services Technology
Consortium, Electronic Check and Check Law (May 15, 1996).
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(3) Other Negotiable Instruments
Paperization of rights is no longer the most efficient method for the transfer of
rights in the checling industry and the same is true for other forms of negotiable
instruments. Centr.alized recording systems provide alternate methods to physical
transfer' Such systems permit the digitalization of existing instruments and the
creation of electrcnic documents.' Transfers of the instruments can be recorded
in a registry system while preserving the essential features of negotiability, including
holder in due couise status.
This notion is not revolutionary; many such systems already exist, including
various systems that retain forms of negotiability.' The secondary mortgage
market relies on book entries as assurances of good title,' and recording is the
principal method for recognizing claims in the real property setting.2 The
securities clearance system is a massive registry that reflects the transfer of millions
of shares daily.' U.S. Treasury Notes and mutual funds are also transferred in
this manner.' Fu thermore, the United States Department of Agriculture permits
the use of a central registry for electronic cotton receipts.' Under these schemes,
the registered owner is treated as being in possession."'
A common denominator of these systems is the existence of a framework that
generally includes the use of a third party as a registry where registration is equated
with possession.' Clearly, this type of system does not presently exist for the
transfer of other negotiable instruments. And while such a mechanism is vital, it
equally seems clear that absent legal recognition, market forces will develop an
alternative means 'to transfer abstract rights. The secondary mortgage market is an
illustration. 3
Unfortunately, developing and implementing a system for the electronic transfer
of negotiable instruments will be a time consuming process. In the interim, there
are two options. The first is simply to exclude negotiable instruments from the
282. See Robertson, supra note 80, at 780; see also U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions
Report § V(A) (noting registry systems offer a potential equivalent to negotiable instruments).
283. See, e.g., Newell & Gordon, supra note 8, at 827-28 (discussing how to create an electronic
mortgage note).
284. Although a cmtral registry system would not require signatures for transfers, technology does
offer the ability for indorsements in this setting. Each instrument that is recorded and electronically
stored could have an allonge attached. This allonge would contain the indorser's unique identification
and security code. See Newell & Gordon, supra note 8, at 830-31.
285. Many recording systems also exist that are outside the scope of negotiable instruments. UCC
central recording mechanisms, such as the indirect holding system in revised article 8 (which allows
"holding in due course"), is an example of such a system.
286. See Rogers, rupra note 252, at 207.
287. See iUL at 203.
288. See id.
289. See 1d.
290. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(A) (Sept. 21, 1998).
291. See id.
292. See id.




scope of writing and signature legislation until more work is conducted. This
approach is suggested by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.2 The alternate
approach is already found in the ETA. Section 115 addresses "transferable
records" - electronic records that would be article 3 notes or article I documents
if they were in writing." Section 115 devises a method of determining when a
person has "control" of a transferable record." Control, which is the electronic
equivalent of possession, is a concept already used by article 9!'
The control approach contained in section 115 provides a workable interim
solution because it is enabling; it establishes the electronic equivalent of possession
until the development of a system that can reliably recognize the rightful holder.
David Whittaker echoed this sentiment stating:
In essence, [section 115] provides a statutory alternative to delivery,
indorsement and possession, the three physical attributes of a
negotiation. It is intended as a 'bridging' section, providing immediate
relief from the writing requirement of Article 3, but with the expectation
that NCCUSL will take up a more extensive review of payment systems
rules and their proper application in the near future. 8
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York only partially agrees - it concurs that a
drafting committee should address the issue, but it disagrees with including an
interim provision in the ETA.' The Bank's reluctance is perhaps surprising, given
its recognition that it already "missed an opportunity . . . to address modem
business practices relating to negotiable notes."' It is precisely missed oppor-
tunities, however, that make an interim provision necessary.
E. Consumer Protection Laws
The Oklahoma Act provides that any transaction is subject to "applicable rules
of law relating to consumer transactions or which have the purpose of consumer
protection."' " The Oklahoma Act further provides that whenever a conflict arises
between the Act and a consumer protection law, the consumer protection statute
governs.' A survey of the Oklahoma Statutes reveals that most consumer
294. See FRB Letter, supra note 258.
295. See U.E.T.A. § 115(a)(1) (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999).
296. See id
297. See U.E.T.A. § 115(d) (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999) ("[A] person having control of a
transferable record is the holder, as defined in [section 1-201(20) of the Uniform Commercial
Code]. .. ."); see also U.C.C. § 9-115 (1999) (discussing "control").
298. Letter from David Whittaker, Senior Counsel, Freddie Mac, to Stephanie Heller, Benjamin
Beard, and Patricia Blumfield Fry 1-2 (Jan. 29, 1999) (accessible at <http.//www.webcom.com/legaled/
ETAForumrdos/020999fm.html>) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
299. See FRB Letter, supra note 258, at 2-3.
300. Id. at 2.
301. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 963(C)(1) (Supp. 1998).
302. See id. § 963(D).
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protection laws concern disclosure provisions.' These laws generally require
"clear and conspicuous" written disclosure of certain terms and conditions.'
A literal reading of the Oklahoma Act appears- to exclude any consumer
transaction that calls for a written disclosure. Because consumer laws govern in
cases of conflict, the Oklahoma Act would not apply to any laws calling for a
written and/or clear and conspicuous disclosure. These disclosures would still have
to be made in a traditional writing. Such a result would be a significant blow to the
growth of electronic commerce. A large percentage of Internet transactions would
be excluded from the Oklahoma Act, as it is reported that as of the fall of 1997,
approximately ten million people had made purchases over the Intemet.'
Consumers may dso be adversely affected by continuing to require written
disclosures given that the potential efficiencies associated with electronic dis-
semination may result in lower costs to consumers.
If these transactions are excluded, the Oklahoma Act's professed purpose of
promoting "public confidence in the validity, integrity, and reliability of electronic
transactions" would be seriously undermined.' The only inconsistency would be
the legislature saying in effect, "We want to create public confidence in electronic
transactions, yet in the interest of protecting the public, all consumer transactions
subject to disclosure laws are excluded." Moreover, excluding consumer transactions
could create confu sion among consumers, many of whom have already purchased
goods over the Internet . ' -
303. Cf. Drafting Committee Meeting Report (Jan. 9-11, 1998) (visited Aug. 28, 1998)
<http'//www.webcorn.comlegaled/ETAForumjan98rpt.html> (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
304. See 14A OKL%. STAT. § 2-211 (1991) (stating in sales transactions, disclosure of discounts for
cash sales be clearly ard conspicuously made); id. § 2-302 (stating the required disclosures for credit
sales be made "clearly and conspicuously ... in writing ... delivered to the buyer."); id. § 2-310.1
(describing the information that must be "clearly and conspicuously disclosed in writing" in a credit card
application); id. § 3-309.1 (also governing the information that must be clearly and conspicuously
disclosed in a credit card application); id. § 3-312 (requiring advertisements for consumer loans to clearly
and conspicuously display credit terms in a tabular format); id. § 5-204 (stating in secured consumer
loans, the creditor must "clearly and conspicuously disclose" the consumer's right to rescind); 17 OKLA.
STAT. § 140.3 (Supp. 1994) (stating advertisements for pay-per-call services directed at children must
clearly and conspicuously state that the child must obtain parental consent); 21 OKL.A. STAT. § 1979
(1991) (stating it is unfawful to sell any good that does not "clearly and conspicuously" display the
manufacturer's name); 24 OKLA. STAT. § 137 (1991) (stating a contract between a buyer and a credit
service organization must be written and include "[a] conspicuous statement in bold face type"); 36
OKLA. STAT. § 1216 (1991) (requiring the gross premium in a life insurance policy to be "shown clearly
and separately"); 47 OKLA. STAT. §§ 12-501 to -507 (1991) (governing written disclosures required by
the Odometer Setting Act); id. § 1112.1 (Supp. 1998) (stating car dealers must disclose in writing any
material damage to a purchased vehicle); 59 OKLA. STAT. § 1509 (1991) (stating all disclosures in a
credit sale by a pawnbroker must be made clearly and conspicuously in a writing delivered to the
customer); id. § 1954 (stating disclosures required by the Oklahoma Rental-Purchase Act be made
clearly, conspicuously and in writing). Most of these provisions mirror federal statutes such as the
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.
305. See Patrick McKenna, Almost Ten Million People Made Internet Purchases, NEWSBYTE NEws
NETWORK, Dec. 12, 1997, at <http.//www.currents.net/newstoday/97/12/16/newsl.html> (on file with the
Oklahoma Law Review).
306. 15 OKLA. STAT. § 961(4) (Supp. 1998).




The drafters of the ETA grappled with this issue as well.' Initially, the ETA's
language mirrored the limiting language contained in the Oklahoma Act," even
though at one time, the Drafting Committee noted that consumer protection laws are
not inconsistent with electronic records and signatures."" The Drafters, however,
completely dropped any language referring to consumer protection statutes in favor
of specifying carve-outs."' The Task Force on State Law Exclusions consequently
recommended the inclusion of consumer protection statutes in the ETA, subject to
an official comment explaining that a law calling for delivery by mail or other
means is not affected."' The Task Force concluded that laws specifying delivery
by mail implicitly emphasize the use of a reliable method of delivery."3 This
conclusion is the correct one given that it is reported that electronic mail delivery
results in one of every 200 messages failing to reach its destination whereas only
one of every 2500 messages delivered by the United States Postal Service are
undelivered.314 Given this discrepancy in reliability rates, consumer protection laws
specifying delivery by mail should be excluded until electronic methods can attain
a similar degree of reliability.
Concerning disclosure provisions, existing consumer protection statutes can be
interpreted as consistent with an electronic format. Draft article 2B and draft revised
article 2 expressly conclude that disclosures of warranty disclaimers can be made
electronically, although these articles provide a media-neutral definition of
"conspicuously." '315 Media neutral definitions, while thorough, are not essential.
Most consumer protection statutes now in force do not specify what constitutes
"clear and conspicuous," yet this lack of guidance has not rendered courts incapable
of applying these rules. Furthermore, even if a law calls for disclosures in bold face
type or all capitals, this can be done electronically. Nothing prevents language on
a website to be in a different font or color. Nonetheless, in the interest of clarity,
legislation should be enacted defining conspicuous in media neutral terms, but until
Contracting to Patricia Blumfield Fry and Benjamin Beard (Dec. 10, 1996) (accessible at
<http:/www.abanet.orgbuslaw/cyber/archivelnccusl.html>) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
308. See Drafting Committee Meeting Report of the ETA Forum, Sept. 19-21, 1997 (visited Aug.
26, 1998) <http//www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/septrpt.html> (on file with the Oklahoma Law
Review).
309. Compare U.E.T.A. § 103 (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999) (not mentioning consumer protection
laws) with 15 OKLA. STAT. § 963(D) (Supp. 1998) and U.E.T.A. § 104(b)(1) (Draft Nov. 25, 1997).
310. See Reporter's Memorandum from Benjamin Beard, Reporter to the Electronic Transactions Act
Drafting Committee and Observers (2)(B) (Nov. 25, 1997) ("[Tlhere would appear to be nothing
inherently unreasonable in allowing consumer protections and disclosures to be accomplished
electronically so long as the purpose of the consumer protections are substantially satisfied.").
311. See U.E.T.A. § 3 (Final Draft July 23-30, 1999) (missing any reference to consumer protection
laws).
312. See U.E.T.A. Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report § V(H) (Sept. 21, 1998).
313. See id.
314. See John M. Moran, Post Oice Deliveries Top E-Mail's: Possibly I in 200 Electronic
Messages Get Lost: The Postal Average Is I in 2,500 Letters, PHILA. INQ., Oct. 9, 1997, at Fl.
315. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text (discussing the ETA's treatment of warranty
modification disclosures). Even though article 2B concludes that disclosures can be electronic, 2B-105(d)
provides that if article 2B conflicts with a consumer protection statute, the conflicting statute governs.
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that time, existing disclosure laws should be construed as applying to electronic
formats." 6
V. Assessing the Need for a Repugnancy Requirement
Much has been written on the need for technologically neutral legislation, and
rightfully so. Lost in the shuffle, however, has been whether and why laws should
be flexible in scope. With the exception of the ETA drafts and reports, virtually no
meaningful discussion has taken place on this issue. Yet the scope of electronic
writing and signature legislation is one of the most important issues because all of
the sensational deliberation over technology is for naught if a law is so limited in
scope as to render it virtually nonexistent.
Previous sections of this comment have given only a taste of the multitude of
writing and signature requirements currently in effect. No article, book, or treatise
could begin to examine every law calling for a writing or signature. The Task Force
on State Law Exclusions initially intended to do so but quickly realized that it
would be a "herculean task."3 '7 Oddly then, the ETA abandoned its use of a
repugnancy clause. The simple fact that every law cannot be examined means that
any electronic sigrature and writing statute which attempts to define exclusions
without including a repugnancy clause will necessarily include laws that should not
be covered, exclude laws that should be covered, or most likely, do both. Granted,
a repugnancy claus-e is not an ideal solution, but until it is possible to identify every
statute calling for a writing or signature requirement, and until technologies exist
that can satisfy the purposes of those statutes in every instance, a repugnancy clause
is the only means available to avoid undesirable and inadvertent application of
electronic writing and signature legislation.
Although the empirical evidence proves that parties will proceed in the face of
legal uncertainty, this engenders extra costs, thus a drawback to a repugnancy
standard is the uncertainty it creates. One such manifestation of additional costs is
judicial inefficiency. A repugnancy standard places the burden on the courts to
determine when an electronic method satisfies the purposes of a writing or signature
requirement. By the same token, this imposition is what gives a repugnancy clause
its flexibility. And this flexibility is especially important given the rapid rate of
technological advances. What is excluded today because of technological inability
may not be a valid reason for exclusion in the near future. It is impossible to know
what advances will arise and when those advances will be seen. Legislative
exclusions, however, create a disincentive to develop new technologies. Simply, if
an area of law is excluded, no new technological method can be given legal effect
316. In a different but related context, the SEC has recognized that disclosures can be made
electronically. The Commission has provided for electronic dissemination of investor disclosure
documents including proxy statements, annual reports, prospectuses, 10-Ks, IO-Qs, and 8Ks. See SEC
Release 33-7233 (Oct. 6, 1995). Under these new guidelines, acceptable delivery forms include e-mail,
websites, LANs, and CD-ROMs. For a thorough discussion of the new regulations, see D. Craig
Nordland, Electronic Dssemination of Disclosure Documents, 1029 PLI/CORP 231 (Jan.-Feb. 1998).




without a change in the law. If, however, the law embraces this contingency,
businesses will be encouraged to develop efficient new methods. By keeping the
law flexible, the marketplace will develop legally acceptable electronic methods.
The policy decision is simply one of weighing inefficiencies: the inefficiencies
placed on the courts by burdening them with making determinations of repugnancy
versus the inefficiencies entrenched in the marketplace by impeding the use of
viable new technologies.
A recent decision by the Iowa Court of Appeals confirms that courts are willing
and able to undertake determinations of repugnancy. In Wilkens v. Iowa Insurance
Commissioners, the court examined the enforceability of a computer generated
signature in light of the purposes behind the statutory requirement.3 ' Wilkens
involved a claim against Allstate Insurance Company brought by local insurance
agents alleging that Allstate failed to comply with an Iowa statute governing written
insurance policies. Specifically, the agents contested Allstate's practice of assigning
all unrepresented policies to a single agent who would electronically countersign the
policies. The agents, who were losing commissions because of the policy, claimed
that the computer generated signatures failed to satisfy the law's signature
requirement because it was not a direct physical signature.
The court held that "the fact that the signature is computer generated rather than
hand-signed does not defeat the purpose of the act."'319 The court reasoned that the
statute did not intend to govern how a signature was made, rather the law only
requires that a signature denotes an intent to be bound." The agents further
challenged the practice of retaining records in an electronic form, alleging that it
violated a statute calling for a "written record of each transaction."32' The court
determined that technology had dramatically altered methods for storing documents
and therefore an electronic record was sufficient to satisfy the requirement."
The common law has always been more responsive to societal and technological
changes than legislative bodies, and Wilkens reaffirms this truth. Much of the
judicial reluctance encountered to date, however, flows from the courts' desire for
statutory action?' Any legislative response satisfies this need, but only a
repugnancy clause removes the obstacle while still providing the flexibility that is
essential if the electronic marketplace is to flourish.
VI. Conclusion
The rapid growth of technology is astounding. Today, there is an entire
generation of persons who witnessed the introduction of the automobile, men
walking on the moon, and genetic engineering. It is difficult to keep abreast of
these advances, much less adapt to them. The law in particular is sluggish in
318. Wilkens v. Iowa Ins. Cornms, 457 N.W.2d I (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
319. Jd. at 3 (emphasis added).
320. See id.
321. Id.
322. See id. at 4.
323. See supra note 221.
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responding to the changing world. Only now are lawmakers drafting and enacting
legislation that gives legal effect to electronic writings and signatures even though
many of these technologies have existed for years. While these new laws are a
positive step, there is a need for guarded optimism.
One reason for hesitation stems from unwarranted limitations on the scope of
electronic writing and signature legislation. This comment demonstrates that not
only is there seldom a writing or signature requirement that cannot be met by some
form of an electronic method, but also that, given the rapid rate at which new
alternatives to paper and ink will arise, any law must be able to give effect to
acceptable new mcdia. The focus of electronic writing and signature legislation,
therefore, should not be on endeavoring to ascertain which laws cannot be satisfied
by an electronic format, but instead to draft laws that enable new developments.
A repugnancy standard is the proper solution. By simply providing that an
electronic medium is recognized only when it satisfies a writing or signature
requirement's purpose, the repugnancy approach avoids the overinclusive and
underinclusive application of electronic writing and signature laws. A repugnancy
standard welcomes the elimination of efficiencies by enabling the full utilization of
technologies in existence today and greeting those of tomorrow with important legal
recognition.
Christopher B. Woods
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